Pakistan Never Built the Iran Gas Pipeline. Now It Needs Tehran to Get LNG Through Hormuz

A Pakistani reader asked why the country is importing LNG through a war-disrupted Strait of Hormuz when Iran sits next door and a gas pipeline has been discussed for decades. The answer leads from sanctions and Pakistan’s unfinished pipeline to an extraordinary 2026 irony: Islamabad now needs Iranian cooperation to help Qatari LNG pass through Hormuz.

A reader asked why Pakistan is bringing gas through a war-disrupted chokepoint when Iran is next door. The answer leads from sanctions to Pakistan’s own failures, and an extraordinary irony created by Hormuz.

A reader left a comment under my recent discussion of Pakistan’s exposure to the Strait of Hormuz.

His question was written in capital letters:

“ALREADY IN PLACE IRAN-PAKISTAN GAS PIPE LINE PROJECT BUT UNDER US SANCTIONS ON IRAN, THIS CANNOT OPERATE?”

I understood what he meant.

I have been hearing versions of this argument in Pakistan for years. Iran has gas. Pakistan needs gas. We share a border.

Somewhere between the two sits the United States with its sanctions.

Why, then, are we bringing liquefied natural gas from Qatar through one of the most dangerous waterways in the world?

The question has become harder to dismiss.

In September, a tanker carrying about 82,000 tonnes of Qatari LNG reached Port Qasim after passing through the badly disrupted Strait of Hormuz. It was Pakistan’s first Qatar-origin LNG cargo through the strait since July. Another Pakistani-bound LNG tanker crossed later in the month.

Before the present war, roughly 125 large commercial vessels passed through Hormuz each day. Reuters counted only 17 commodity vessels crossing during the weekend of September 19–20. Some vessels may have been moving without normal tracking, but the collapse in visible commercial traffic was extraordinary.

I live in Karachi. Port Qasim is not an abstraction to me.

Neither is the gas shortage.

So I went back to the reader’s question.

It turns out that one part of his comment is right. Another part needs correcting.

Between the two lies a story Pakistan has avoided for more than twenty years.

The Pipeline Pakistan Never Built

The Iran-Pakistan pipeline is not a completed pipe waiting for someone to open a valve.

That distinction matters.

Under the original arrangement, Iran was to supply Pakistan with roughly 750 million cubic feet of gas a day. Pakistan was responsible for constructing approximately 781 kilometres of pipeline on its side.

Iran made substantial physical progress.

Pakistan did not build its section.

Petroleum Minister Ali Pervaiz Malik told the Senate in August that sanctions remained in place and Pakistan was therefore not taking practical construction steps. He also confirmed something more serious: the dispute between Pakistan and Iran had reached an arbitration tribunal in Paris. Dawn reported the minister’s account and the arbitration dispute.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has since established a high-level committee to examine the legal and energy questions surrounding the project, along with its financial implications.

There is another number that frequently appears whenever Pakistanis discuss this project: $18 billion.

I would be careful with it.

It has repeatedly been described as the penalty Pakistan might face for failing to fulfil its obligations. Pakistan’s parliamentary record makes clear, however, that the question of liability is tied to arbitration. Iran disputes Pakistan’s argument that sanctions created a force majeure or excusing event. Pakistan’s National Assembly record sets out the government’s sanctions position.

Pakistan does not currently have an established $18 billion bill sitting on a desk.

What it has is an unresolved international contractual dispute whose eventual cost remains uncertain.

What American Sanctions Actually Do

This is where Pakistani arguments often become too simple.

We sometimes speak of American sanctions as though Washington has placed a physical lock on the pipeline.

Pakistan’s Petroleum Division has explicitly told parliament that the project stalled because of international sanctions on Iran. It also said Pakistan had been unable to begin construction because of U.S. sanctions and had approached Washington through diplomatic channels seeking an exemption.

Sanctions cannot simply be dismissed as Islamabad’s excuse.

But consider what constructing and operating the pipeline would require.

Somebody has to finance it. Contractors willing to work on an Iranian project must then be found, equipment purchased and payments processed through banks that may have international exposure.

That is where sanctions begin to bite.

A bank does not need an American official to telephone its chief executive every morning.

If its compliance department believes an Iranian transaction creates unacceptable sanctions exposure, that can be enough. A contractor with international business may reach the same conclusion.

The project can stop without anyone physically blocking the pipe.

Pakistan’s Foreign Office added an important qualification in June. It said sanctions affecting economic cooperation with Iran were not exclusively American and specifically mentioned European restrictions as well. The Foreign Office briefing described the broader sanctions environment.

The reader who blamed U.S. sanctions therefore identified a major part of the problem.

He did not identify all of it.

Sanctions Are Not Pakistan’s Entire Alibi

This part makes me uncomfortable because Pakistanis, myself included, are accustomed to looking for the external power behind a national problem.

Sometimes it is there.

But twenty years is a long time.

Pakistan struggled with financing. Construction never began on the required scale. Commercial circumstances changed while governments came and went.

Iran waited.

Deadlines moved.

Eventually lawyers entered the story.

The result is peculiar. Pakistan needs gas and once signed a long-term agreement to buy Iranian gas, yet the country never constructed the infrastructure required to receive it.

Sanctions help explain that history.

They should not prevent us from examining Pakistan’s own decisions inside it.

Pakistan today is not the Pakistan that negotiated this pipeline.

The Pakistan That Signed This Deal No Longer Exists

Drive around Karachi in daylight and look upward.

Solar panels are difficult to miss now.

They are sitting on houses and shops. Industrial buildings have them too. Pakistan’s rapid solar expansion has started reshaping daytime electricity demand.

That matters to the pipeline debate.

Power Minister Awais Leghari told Reuters earlier this year that around 74% of Pakistan’s electricity was being generated from domestic sources in March. LNG accounted for roughly 10% of power generation and remained particularly useful for evening demand.

Pakistan had even cancelled 21 LNG cargoes scheduled for 2026–27 under its long-term arrangement with Italy’s Eni because demand had weakened.

That is quite a change from the Pakistan that negotiated the Iran gas deal.

We cannot take a twenty-year-old energy argument, dust it off and assume the economics remain identical.

The pipeline may still make sense.

Somebody needs to prove it with today’s numbers.

The $10 Gas Question

Geography plays tricks on us.

Iran is next door. Qatar is across the Gulf.

Surely Iranian gas must therefore be cheaper.

Perhaps.

Proximity alone doesn’t answer the question.

The Pakistan Institute of Development Economics recently revisited the project. Using the proposed Brent-linked pricing formula, PIDE calculated that at an illustrative Brent price of $75 a barrel, the gas commodity price would work out at about $10.09 per MMBtu. Read PIDE’s economic assessment.

That is an illustrative calculation, not a quotation for gas Pakistan could buy tomorrow.

Taking 750 million cubic feet every day could imply an annual gas-purchase commitment of roughly $2.84 billion, according to the same analysis.

Pakistan would still need to finance and construct its section of the pipeline.

Other analysts reach a more favourable conclusion. Energy-market specialists interviewed by S&P Global estimated that Iranian pipeline gas could save Pakistan roughly $3–$6 per MMBtu compared with LNG under their assumptions. They also cautioned that geopolitical obstacles would have to ease and commercial terms might require renegotiation. S&P Global reported the competing estimates.

I find the disagreement useful.

It tells us that “Iranian gas is cheap” is not an analysis.

Neither is “the pipeline is uneconomic.”

Run the numbers again.

The Pakistan of 2026 deserves a 2026 calculation.

Then Came the War

Pakistan’s LNG normally comes from Qatar.

To reach us by sea, it has to pass through Hormuz.

The war has turned that routine voyage into something requiring diplomacy.

In May, Reuters reported an extraordinary development. Pakistan had reached an arrangement with Iran concerning the passage of Qatari LNG shipments through Hormuz. Iran was increasingly regulating passage through the strait as normal commercial movement collapsed. Reuters reported on Pakistan’s Hormuz arrangement with Iran.

Read that again.

Pakistan could not complete a pipeline to bring Iranian gas across the land border.

Then Pakistan had to deal with Iran so that gas from somewhere else could get through the sea.

By September, this was no longer a one-off curiosity. Pakistan again secured passage for another Qatari LNG shipment through diplomatic engagement involving Iran.

That is the part of this story I cannot get out of my head.

For decades, sanctions made energy cooperation with Iran extraordinarily difficult.

Now the geography of the war has made cooperation with Iran relevant to Pakistan’s access to non-Iranian energy too.

The old debate has been turned upside down.

A Pipeline Would Solve One Problem, Not All of Them

At this point it would be easy to write the angry conclusion.

Build the pipeline.

Tell Washington Pakistan needs energy.

Problem solved.

I don’t think the evidence allows me to say that.

A land pipeline could reduce Pakistan’s exposure to the Strait of Hormuz for the volume of gas it carried. That is a genuine strategic advantage.

The gas, however, would come from Iran, a country under sanctions and at the centre of the present conflict. Pakistan would still need a workable payment mechanism.

There is also the physical route through Balochistan. Any serious costing of the project has to include the problem of protecting infrastructure over decades.

And while all this has been happening, Pakistan’s gas market itself has changed.

Solar has altered electricity-consumption patterns. The gas sector carries enormous circular debt. A long-term gas commitment that looked sensible in another era requires another look now.

This is why I don’t see the Iran pipeline as a magic route to Pakistani energy independence.

A pipeline can bypass Hormuz. It cannot bypass geopolitics.

The Reader’s Question Was Better Than It Looked

I went back to that capital-letter comment after doing this research.

“Already in place” was wrong.

Pakistan’s part isn’t.

The suggestion that sanctions have prevented the project from operating was much closer to reality, although sanctions are not the whole explanation.

Yet the reader had noticed something important.

Pakistan is struggling to obtain LNG through a maritime chokepoint while an unfinished gas project sits in our diplomatic files involving the country next door.

The irony has become stranger.

Pakistan has had to seek Iranian cooperation over the passage of Qatari LNG through Hormuz while the Iran-Pakistan land pipeline remains stalled.

I can imagine one of those tankers eventually approaching Port Qasim.

Most people in Karachi will never see it.

We will notice the consequences elsewhere, perhaps in a gas bill or another government announcement about energy conservation.

That is what has changed for me about this old pipeline debate.

I am not convinced that Pakistan should simply start laying pipe tomorrow. The sanctions problem is real. So are the contractual and financial questions.

But I am equally uncomfortable with pretending that doing nothing carries no cost.

For twenty years Pakistan has worried about the price of building the pipe.

Hormuz has now shown us the price of not having enough alternatives.

Raast Hawala Monitoring: The Money Looks Local. The Hawala Network May Not Be

A Raast transfer can be domestic while the economic deal behind it starts abroad. Pakistan’s AML challenge is to detect that hidden relationship.

FATF’s Oman case shows why Pakistani banks must detect cross-border relationships hidden inside ordinary domestic payments.

A Pakistani bank can receive a perfectly ordinary Raast transfer at 10:17 in the morning. Imagine Rs85,000 entering a personal account in Karachi. The beneficiary is known, the account is active, and the payment arrives through Pakistan’s national instant-payment system. Nothing in the payment message says Oman, hawaladar or informal remittance.

Yet the economic story behind the transfer may have begun in Muscat.

Raast hawala monitoring therefore cannot stop at the domestic payment message. FATF’s September 2026 report on underground banking and hawala describes an Oman case in which suspected operators offered expatriates cheaper remittance services and used payment channels in destination countries, including fee-free Raast transfers in Pakistan. SBP correctly responded that Raast itself does not process cross-border transfers and that FATF did not identify Raast as a money-laundering mechanism.

Both statements can be true. A domestic payment rail can remain technically sound while an informal network uses it for the local payout leg of a wider cross-border arrangement.

Raast Hawala Monitoring Cannot Depend on One Transaction

The first mistake would be to treat every unusual Raast payment as evidence of hawala. Raast has become too large and too ordinary for that approach.

SBP’s Q2 FY26 Payment Systems Review shows how quickly the system has expanded:

MeasureQ2 FY25Q2 FY26Change
Total Raast transactions295.7 million645.7 million+118%
Total valuePKR 6.36 trillionPKR 18.47 trillion+190%
P2P transactions293.7 million603.0 million+105%
P2P valuePKR 6.14 trillionPKR 15.69 trillion+156%
Percent changes calculated from SBP quarterly payment-system data.

At that scale, a crude rule based on transaction value will create noise. A salary account may suddenly receive money for a wedding. A small trader may collect payments from many customers. A family may move funds between relatives. None of those facts proves an informal remittance arrangement.

Banks need to ask a different question: does the behaviour fit what they know about the customer?

SBP’s AML/CFT/CPF rules already point in that direction. Regulated entities are expected to use automated transaction-monitoring systems and compare activity with customer profiles. Transactions that depart from the history or normal operation of an account require closer examination.

Raast adds speed and volume to an old monitoring problem. The answer should not be to make Raast slower.

The Account Pattern Matters More Than the Payment

A single domestic transfer often tells very little. A sequence can tell much more.

Compliance teams should pay attention when a personal account receives funds from many unrelated senders and quickly disperses them to other beneficiaries. Analysts often describe those patterns as fan-in and fan-out. Rapid pass-through matters too: money arrives and leaves so quickly that the account behaves more like a conduit than an account used for normal personal or business activity.

FMU’s own hawala typologies have repeatedly highlighted accounts with activity inconsistent with the customer’s profile, unrelated counterparties and rapid movement of funds. Older payment instruments produced those patterns before Raast existed. Instant payments can now compress the same behaviour into minutes.

No single indicator should trigger an accusation. A marketplace seller can show high fan-in. A payroll account can show fan-out. A charity can receive money from people who have no obvious relationship with one another.

Context decides whether the pattern deserves escalation. Banks need combinations of signals followed by human review.

KYC Must Become Behavioural, Not Merely Documentary

Know Your Customer often receives most attention when an account is opened. The customer provides an identity document, occupation, expected income and purpose of account. The file can look complete on day one and become stale months later.

Digital hawala makes ongoing profiling more important.

A stronger model would continuously compare actual account behaviour with the customer’s expected activity. A salaried person who suddenly begins receiving dozens of transfers from unrelated people deserves a different review from a retailer whose business naturally produces the same pattern.

Centralised KYC could help, but the phrase needs care. Pakistan should not create a giant pool of customer data that every institution can browse. Privacy and data-security rules must govern legal access.

A more defensible goal is consistent customer-risk information and stronger ecosystem-level analytics under clear regulatory authority. Banks still need responsibility for their own customers. SBP and FMU need enough visibility to identify patterns that cross institutional boundaries.

Better profiling should reduce false positives rather than multiply them.

From I. I. Chundrigar Road, the Gap Looks Familiar

Working around banking and SWIFT taught me to separate the message from the economic relationship behind it.

A SWIFT message can be technically valid while the underlying transaction still raises a compliance question. Nobody would conclude that SWIFT itself had failed simply because a suspicious payment used the network. Investigators would examine the parties and the economic purpose of the transaction.

Raast deserves the same distinction.

SBP’s September 4 clarification matters because some reporting blurred the line. Raast currently handles domestic payments. FATF did not say that Raast carried money from Oman into Pakistan.

The Oman case points to a different mechanism. A customer abroad can give value to a hawala operator. The network can create an obligation to pay a beneficiary in Pakistan. A counterpart in Pakistan can then use local funds to make the payout through Raast.

The Raast transaction remains domestic. The economic relationship does not.

Digitalisation therefore does not automatically eliminate hawala. It can give an informal network a cheaper domestic payout tool while the cross-border settlement happens somewhere else.

Banks Need Network Analysis, Not More Blanket Limits

Pakistan should resist the easiest response: lowering limits for everyone.

Blanket restrictions punish ordinary customers and weaken one of Raast’s main advantages. They can also push activity back toward cash, where monitoring becomes harder.

Banks should instead examine networks. An account that repeatedly receives funds from unrelated people may connect to another account showing the same behaviour. Several accounts may share devices or contact details where law and available data permit those links to be analysed. Recurring counterparties can reveal a pattern that no individual payment exposes.

FMU typologies already show the value of connected-account analysis. One published hawala case describes interlinked accounts with heavy turnover and unrelated counterparties. Another describes rapid movement of funds linked with people already suspected of illegal foreign-exchange activity.

Fraud monitoring and AML monitoring also need different questions. Fraud systems often ask whether the customer authorised a payment. AML systems ask whether an authorised payment makes economic sense in the customer’s broader activity. A transfer can pass authentication checks and still deserve AML review.

Graph analysis can help compliance teams find those relationships, but an algorithm should not become a verdict. Analysts still need evidence and customer context. Their reasoning should be documented before an STR is filed.

SBP Can See a Problem One Bank May Miss

One bank may see only one fragment.

Imagine an account at Bank A receiving money from several customers. Some funds move to Bank B. Another part reaches a wallet at a third institution. Each institution sees its own customer and its own transactions.

No bank necessarily sees the whole network.

SBP, Raast’s operator and FMU occupy different positions in the system. Their legal powers and responsibilities also differ. Pakistan should examine whether privacy-preserving, regulator-led analytics can identify cross-bank patterns without turning the payment system into an unrestricted customer-surveillance database.

The distinction matters. Central visibility should identify risk patterns and support lawful investigation. It should not erase institutional accountability or customer privacy.

A sensible model would allow regulators to identify suspicious network structures and then route intelligence to the institutions or authorities legally entitled to act on it.

Speed also matters. Instant payments can move through several accounts before a traditional case-review process begins. Monitoring has to become closer to the speed of the payment system without assuming that every fast transfer is suspicious.

The Missing Record May Sit Outside Pakistan

FATF’s Oman case exposes the hardest problem.

A Pakistani bank can see the domestic payout. It may know the account holder and counterparties in Pakistan. The bank may even detect rapid pass-through behaviour. Yet none of those records necessarily explains why someone in Oman handed money or value to an informal operator.

The missing information may sit with an Omani bank, an e-wallet provider or investigators who identified the suspected hawala network.

FMU already has a legal basis for cooperation with foreign financial-intelligence units. Its international-cooperation guidance explains that Section 6(4)(e) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act empowers FMU to exchange relevant information with counterpart financial-intelligence units through reciprocal arrangements.

That international connection is where Raast hawala monitoring becomes more than a software problem.

Pakistan can improve customer profiling while banks tune transaction-monitoring scenarios. Regulator-led analysis can also expose cross-bank patterns. Even together, those measures cannot reconstruct an offshore relationship that never appears in the domestic payment message.

The next test is whether Pakistan can connect a suspicious-looking domestic pattern with foreign intelligence quickly enough to understand what it means.

A payment in Karachi may look entirely local.

The record that explains it may be sitting in Muscat.

Related Reading: Pakistan Built Raast to Fight Cash. Hawala Found a Way In

This analysis was drafted under editorial direction with AI technical assistance, then verified and edited by Munaeem Jamal.

“A Very Pakistani Problem”? How Palki Sharma Turned a Regional Energy Shock Into a Pakistan Punchline

Palki Sharma called Pakistan’s fuel crisis “a very Pakistani problem.” I examine the military exemption, Iran sanctions and the regional energy shock.

I was watching Palki Sharma explain Pakistan’s latest fuel-conservation measures when the tone changed.

At first, I recognised the country she was describing. Markets closing earlier. Government vehicles getting less fuel. Officials being told to cut travel. These are uncomfortable measures for people already watching petrol prices and household expenses.

Then came the jokes.

Pakistan’s attempt to conserve fuel became a “lockdown.” An exemption for operational military vehicles became a claim that the armed forces could use as much fuel as they wanted.

Later came the sharper line. Pakistan, viewers were told, may keep running out of resources, but apparently never runs out of bad decisions.

One sentence caught my attention because it sat awkwardly beside what followed.

“This is not a crisis of Pakistan’s making,” Sharma said.

Quite.

The interesting question is how a regional energy shock then became, in the same commentary, “a very Pakistani problem.”

Pakistan really has imposed painful restrictions

There is no reason for me to pretend Islamabad has handled energy security brilliantly.

It has not.

On September 17, the federal government announced a three-month austerity and fuel-conservation drive as higher international petroleum prices put Pakistan under growing pressure. Fuel allocations for official vehicles were cut by 50 percent. Purchases of new government vehicles were banned. Foreign official travel was heavily restricted for three months, according to the government announcement reported by Radio Pakistan.

Government departments were also told to make greater use of teleconferencing. Most official dinners were prohibited, except those involving visiting foreign delegations.

Commercial restrictions affect ordinary life more visibly.

Markets and most shops must close by 9 p.m. Marriage halls close by 10 p.m. Restaurants can operate until 11 p.m., while takeaway and home delivery remain exempt. Pharmacies and hospitals are among the essential services exempt from the closing restrictions. Fuel stations remain exempt as well.

The government has also retained the single-dish requirement for marriage functions.

Those measures are real.

Calling them a “lockdown” is editorial framing.

Pakistanis have not been ordered into their homes. Economic activity has not been generally suspended. Businesses are operating under restricted hours.

The word works well on television because anyone who lived through Covid immediately understands the image.

It also makes the policy sound more dramatic than the notification itself.

A regional energy crisis sits behind the Pakistani story

Pakistan did not suddenly wake up in September and forget how to buy oil.

The regional conflict has severely disrupted energy flows. Reuters reported on September 17 that the worsening Gulf conflict was putting Pakistan and other Asian energy importers under intense pressure.

Pakistan entered that crisis badly exposed.

Reuters reported in May that up to 90 percent of Pakistan’s oil and LNG imports depended on supplies moving through the Strait of Hormuz. The same report found that Pakistan had no strategic petroleum reserve. Islamabad was studying expanded storage and a reserve system, but those plans had not yet produced the buffer that a prolonged emergency demands.

That failure belongs to Pakistan.

An import-dependent country sitting close to one of the world’s most dangerous energy chokepoints should have spent years preparing for disruption. Governments knew the geography. They also knew how quickly an oil shock could damage Pakistan’s fragile balance of payments.

Yet the vulnerability remained.

Criticism should start there.

No, the military was not given unlimited fuel

The military section of Sharma’s commentary is where the difference between criticism and caricature becomes clearer.

“Of course, these rules are not for everyone,” she said.

Then came the claim: “They can use as much fuel as they want.”

The official measure is narrower.

The Cabinet Division measures exempt operational vehicles belonging to the Armed Forces and Civil Armed Forces. Operational vehicles of law-enforcement agencies are also exempt, as are those used by essential services and the Federal Board of Revenue. Administrative and non-operational formations do not receive that exemption, according to the officially reported measures.

That distinction matters.

An ambulance cannot simply stop responding because a monthly fuel allocation has been exhausted. The same practical problem applies to emergency law-enforcement operations. Military vehicles performing genuine operational duties raise a comparable issue.

None of this places Pakistan’s military beyond scrutiny.

Quite the reverse. The government should be able to explain how it defines “operational.” Public scrutiny also matters because a broad interpretation could undermine the savings promised by the policy.

Yet the debate should begin with the measure that actually exists.

“Operational military vehicles are exempt” and “they can use as much fuel as they want” are materially different descriptions.

The second one makes better television.

November is the real warning

The segment also leaves viewers with an impression that Pakistan is approaching the bottom of its fuel tanks.

Petroleum Minister Ali Pervaiz Malik gave a more precise account.

He said Pakistan had adequate stocks for September. The government had also reduced the risk to October supplies even under an adverse scenario.

November worried him.

“We have adequate stocks,” Malik said. Even under difficult conditions, he explained, October was covered, “but November I have to plan,” according to Business Recorder.

That is serious.

It is not the same as saying Pakistan will run out of fuel after two months.

Islamabad is now looking far beyond its traditional suppliers. Malik identified Oman and Fujairah as possible sources. He also said Pakistan was exploring Libya and the United States, while West African crude and Kazakhstan were under consideration.

One proposal reveals another Pakistani weakness.

The government is examining whether it can bring American crude in a Very Large Crude Carrier, or VLCC. Malik said such vessels can carry about four times the crude transported by the carriers Pakistan normally uses.

Then the infrastructure problem appears.

According to Malik, existing Pakistani ports lack the draft and infrastructure required to berth these giant vessels. One possibility would involve parking a VLCC near Hub or at Sohar in Oman, followed by ship-to-ship transfers into smaller vessels bound for Pakistan.

Pakistan also has a limited number of vessels available to manage these movements, Malik acknowledged.

Here is a genuine Pakistani problem.

Why did an import-dependent country enter a major energy emergency without a proper strategic reserve?

Why does port infrastructure still constrain the ability to diversify crude supplies quickly?

Those questions concern Pakistani choices. They deserve uncomfortable answers.

They do not require punchlines.

Then I looked west from Karachi

Something else bothered me while listening to the list of possible suppliers.

The United States. Libya. West Africa.

Iran sits next door.

From Karachi, the geography looks strange. Pakistan may consider bringing crude across an ocean while a major petroleum producer lies across our western border.

The explanation begins in the financial system.

For a short period this summer, Washington loosened part of the sanctions framework. OFAC issued General License X in June, authorising specified transactions involving Iranian-origin crude and petroleum products.

That opening did not last.

On July 7, OFAC revoked General License X and replaced it with General License X1 to wind down the June authorisation, according to the U.S. Treasury’s OFAC notice.

As of September, OFAC continues to maintain an extensive Iran sanctions programme. Its current Iran sanctions guidance makes clear that some Iran-related activities can proceed when specifically licensed, which is why saying simply that all Iranian oil transactions are “illegal” would be inaccurate.

For Pakistan, the practical problem goes beyond the wording of one American licence.

An Iranian barrel can be close and still difficult to buy

I work around cross-border payments, so this part of the story immediately catches my attention.

Buying crude requires more than finding a seller.

A payment has to move. Banks must accept the transaction and the counterparties involved. Shipping arrangements have to function under the applicable sanctions environment.

Once sanctions screening enters that chain, a commercially attractive transaction can become difficult very quickly.

That is the Iran paradox.

Pakistan and Iran share a border. Yet an Iranian barrel can be financially harder for Pakistan to obtain through conventional international channels than crude travelling a much greater physical distance.

That does not mean Iranian energy is irrelevant to Pakistan.

Quite the opposite.

During the present crisis, Iran has already demonstrated its importance to Pakistan’s energy security in another way. Reuters reported in May that Pakistan and Iraq had reached arrangements with Iran concerning passage of oil and LNG through the Gulf while Tehran exercised greater control over traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

Geography still matters.

Financial architecture matters too.

A map shows only half the problem.

Pakistan still owns its failures

None of this absolves Islamabad.

The present crisis has exposed weaknesses that should have been addressed before energy routes came under severe pressure.

Strategic reserves provide the clearest example. Pakistan depends heavily on imported energy moving through Hormuz, yet Reuters found in May that the country lacked a dedicated strategic petroleum reserve.

Port capability creates another constraint.

If Pakistan wants a genuinely diversified crude supply, it needs infrastructure capable of handling economical long-distance shipments. Reliance on offshore transfers and smaller feeder vessels adds complexity when the country is already under pressure.

Energy diversification also requires more than finding another seller whenever war closes a route.

Asia as a whole has been learning that lesson during the Iran conflict. Reuters reported earlier in the crisis that governments across the region were scrambling for alternatives as disrupted supplies raised costs and exposed import dependence.

Pakistan has less financial room than many larger Asian economies to absorb such shocks.

That makes preparation more important, not less.

I do not need an Indian television presenter to tell me Pakistan has made poor energy decisions.

I live here.

Every increase at the petrol pump eventually reaches the household budget. Transport becomes more expensive. Food follows sooner or later.

For people dealing with those costs, the fuel crisis is not an amusing abstraction.

That is why accuracy matters.

When criticism turns into performance

Palki Sharma had the ingredients for a stronger story.

Pakistan entered this emergency dangerously dependent on Gulf energy routes. It lacked the strategic petroleum reserve that such exposure should have encouraged. Its port limitations now complicate attempts to diversify crude supplies quickly.

Then there is Iran.

A major petroleum producer lies next door, yet sanctions and the international financial system complicate the commercial value of that proximity. OFAC’s brief opening in June, followed by its July revocation and wind-down, shows how quickly that environment can change.

Those are difficult stories.

Instead, parts of the segment fall back on a familiar image of Pakistani dysfunction.

The most revealing moment remains Sharma’s acknowledgement:

“This is not a crisis of Pakistan’s making.”

She is right about the immediate external shock.

Pakistan did not create the regional conflict or the resulting disruption of energy flows.

Pakistan did, however, enter that crisis with vulnerabilities of its own making.

Both facts belong in the story.

A serious critique can ask why Pakistan lacked stronger reserves before the crisis arrived. It can investigate whether military exemptions remain tightly confined to operational use. It can examine why port constraints make emergency diversification harder.

There is enough there to make Islamabad uncomfortable without stretching the facts.

After checking the Cabinet Division notification and the petroleum minister’s remarks, I returned to the final minutes of the broadcast.

Pakistan, we are told, may keep running out of resources but never out of bad decisions.

Some Pakistani decisions certainly deserve their own investigation.

Yet I am left thinking about something else.

When a regional energy crisis crosses a border and enters a television studio, at what point does journalism stop explaining another country and begin performing that country for its audience?

How Does Physical Activity Affect Bone Health in Older Adults?

Physical activity can help protect ageing bones, but walking alone may not provide the strongest skeletal stimulus. Current evidence shows why resistance training, appropriate weight-bearing activity and balance exercise all have different roles in maintaining bone health and reducing fracture risk.

I often see older people walking in Karachi early in the morning. Some move briskly around a park. Others walk slowly along a neighbourhood road before the traffic becomes unbearable.

It looks like exactly what doctors have been telling us to do for years: keep moving.

But there is a question we rarely ask. Is walking enough to protect our bones as we grow older?

The answer is more complicated than I once thought.

Physical activity remains one of the most useful tools we have for healthy ageing. Yet current evidence shows that bones do not respond equally to every type of movement. Walking helps. Strength training can provide a different stimulus. Balance exercises matter for another reason entirely: they may stop the fall that causes the fracture.

For older adults, therefore, the important question is no longer simply whether we exercise.

It is what kind of exercise we do.

What Happens to Our Bones as We Age?

Bone looks permanent, but biologically it is active tissue.

Throughout life, the body continuously removes old bone and forms new bone. With ageing, particularly after menopause in women, bone breakdown can outpace bone formation. Bone mineral density may decline, and the skeleton can become more vulnerable to fractures.

Ageing also affects muscle.

That combination matters. Weaker bones increase the consequences of a fall, while weaker muscles and poorer balance can increase the chance of falling in the first place.

This is why exercise has more than one role in protecting an older person.

According to the U.S. National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases, physical activity can support bone health while also improving muscle strength, coordination and balance.

The last two benefits deserve more attention than they usually receive.

A stronger hip is useful.

Not falling on that hip may be even more useful.

Exercise Cannot Turn an Older Skeleton Back into a Young One

Health articles sometimes exaggerate what exercise can achieve.

The claim that exercise simply “builds strong bones” needs qualification when we talk about older adults.

Exercise during childhood and early adulthood helps build bone mass. Later in life, the objective changes. The NIAMS guidance on osteoporosis explains that exercise in older adults is particularly valuable for maintaining function, improving strength and balance, and limiting the consequences of age-related decline.

Changes in bone mineral density from exercise can be modest.

That does not make exercise ineffective.

Recent systematic reviews and meta-analyses show that resistance-training effects vary according to exercise intensity, frequency and the skeletal site being measured. Some programmes produce measurable improvements, while differences at other sites are less certain.

The research also illustrates why simple statements such as “lifting weights increases bone density” can mislead readers.

The response depends on the programme and the person.

Walking Is Excellent, but Walking Alone May Not Be Enough

This point deserves special attention because walking is probably the most accessible exercise for older adults.

Walking has many advantages. It keeps us mobile. Brisk walking counts as weight-bearing activity, and it supports cardiovascular fitness and independence.

I would never tell an older person who has started walking that the activity is unimportant.

But walking should not automatically become the entire bone-health programme.

Bones respond to mechanical loading. Different activities impose different forces on the skeleton. Ordinary walking generally creates less skeletal stimulus than appropriately designed resistance or impact exercise.

The Royal Osteoporosis Society recommends combining impact activity with strength exercise when this is appropriate for the individual.

So a daily walk remains valuable.

The better question is what can safely accompany it.

Strength Training Becomes Increasingly Important

This is where the evidence becomes particularly useful.

Resistance training means making muscles work against resistance. That resistance does not have to come from a barbell in a gym.

It can come from dumbbells or resistance bands. Body weight can also provide resistance.

When muscles contract against resistance, they place forces on bones. The body can respond to this mechanical loading.

The Royal Osteoporosis Society’s strength-exercise guidance recommends strength exercise two or three days a week for people who can perform it safely, with appropriate progression and technique.

Research continues to refine exactly how hard older adults need to train.

Recent systematic reviews comparing resistance-training programmes suggest that greater intensity can improve strength, but bone-density responses are not identical at every skeletal site. That is a useful warning against turning “heavier is better” into another simplistic rule.

The goal is not to make every 70-year-old lift the heaviest weight possible.

The goal is to provide an appropriate and progressive stimulus.

What About Jogging, Jumping and Other Impact Exercise?

Here we need caution.

Impact exercise produces forces through the skeleton. Depending on the person, activities involving greater impact may provide a useful bone stimulus.

But this does not mean every older adult should start jogging or jumping.

The Royal Osteoporosis Society classifies walking and stair climbing as relatively low-impact activities. Jogging, small jumps and some forms of dancing create greater impact.

Its guidance makes an important distinction. Moderate-impact activity may benefit bones, but high-impact exercise is not specifically required for people with osteoporosis. Someone who already performs higher-impact activity comfortably may be in a different situation from an older person with spinal fractures who suddenly decides to start jumping.

Medical history changes the equation.

A person with osteoporosis, previous fragility fractures, painful arthritis or significant balance problems may need a modified programme.

This is precisely why an exercise that is good for one 65-year-old may be unsuitable for another.

Stronger Bones Are Only Half the Story

Imagine two older adults with similar bone density.

One has strong legs and good balance. The other struggles when rising from a chair and becomes unstable when turning quickly.

Their fracture risks are not necessarily identical.

Many fractures occur after falls. Preventing the fall therefore becomes part of protecting the skeleton.

The NIAMS exercise guidance specifically recommends balance training for older adults.

Balance work can take several forms. Tai chi is one example. Carefully performed step-ups and weight-shifting exercises are others.

The purpose is practical.

An older person who can recover after stumbling over a doorstep may avoid the event that would otherwise produce a hip fracture.

Exercise therefore protects us through two different mechanisms.

Some activities load the skeleton and help preserve bone strength. Others improve the muscles, coordination and balance that help keep us upright.

A good programme considers both.

Bone Density Is Not the Whole Measure of Success

This also changes how we should interpret research.

Bone mineral density, usually measured by a DXA scan, is an important marker of osteoporosis and fracture risk. But it does not capture every benefit of exercise.

Suppose an older person’s DXA result changes very little after months of exercise.

Was the programme useless?

Not necessarily.

If that person has stronger legs, walks more confidently and can recover balance more effectively, the exercise may still have reduced important contributors to fracture risk.

This distinction explains why relatively modest changes in bone mineral density should not be interpreted as evidence that exercise does little for older adults.

Healthy ageing is not a laboratory number alone.

It is also the ability to stand, walk and remain independent.

Exercise Does Not Replace Osteoporosis Treatment

Another correction is necessary.

Exercise is sometimes presented online as a natural alternative to osteoporosis medication.

The evidence does not support that claim.

The Royal Osteoporosis Society states that exercise and healthy habits do not replace osteoporosis medicine when medication is clinically indicated.

Someone at high risk of fracture may need medical treatment in addition to exercise.

Nutrition matters as well. Adequate calcium, vitamin D and protein form part of the wider picture, depending on individual dietary intake and medical circumstances.

Exercise belongs inside that framework.

It should not be sold as a cure.

Who Should Be Particularly Careful?

Most older adults can benefit from becoming more active, but the starting point matters.

A healthy 65-year-old who already walks several kilometres and has good balance is not in the same position as an 80-year-old with vertebral fractures.

The Royal Osteoporosis Society’s safety guidance recommends seeking professional advice when someone has spinal fractures, multiple previous fractures, recurrent falls or medical problems that make exercise difficult.

People who have been inactive should also progress gradually.

Technique matters during resistance exercise. So does balance before attempting more demanding impact movements.

Pain, severe breathlessness, dizziness or chest symptoms during exercise should not simply be ignored in the hope of becoming fitter.

Age should not frighten us away from movement.

Medical circumstances should shape how we move.

So What Should an Older Adult Actually Do?

I would resist the temptation to prescribe one universal routine.

The evidence instead points toward a combination.

Regular walking or another suitable aerobic activity can keep a person moving. Progressive resistance exercise can challenge muscles and bones more directly. Balance work can reduce one of the major pathways to fracture: falling.

The precise intensity must depend on fitness, bone health and previous fractures.

This approach is less dramatic than promising that one exercise will rebuild ageing bones.

It is also much closer to the evidence.

The Question Has Changed for Me

When I see older people walking in the morning now, I still regard that habit as something worth protecting.

Getting out of the chair matters.

Walking matters.

But our understanding of bone health should move beyond the advice to “stay active.”

An ageing skeleton needs appropriate loading. An ageing body also needs enough muscle and balance to avoid the fall that can turn low bone density into a broken hip.

Physical activity cannot stop ageing.

It can, however, change how we age.

For many older adults, the most useful programme may therefore be neither endless walking nor aggressive gym training. It is a carefully chosen combination of movement, resistance and balance, adjusted as the body changes.

And when osteoporosis or previous fractures enter the picture, the exercise should adapt with them.

Medical note: This article provides general health information and does not replace individual medical advice. People with osteoporosis, previous fragility or spinal fractures, recurrent falls, significant joint disease, or other medical conditions should discuss new or substantially more intensive exercise with an appropriate healthcare professional.

Iran Does Not Have to Close Hormuz to Hurt Pakistan. The Bill Has Already Arrived

Pakistan is not fighting the Iran war, yet disrupted Hormuz shipping is already raising energy costs and forcing fuel relief at home. Here is how the Gulf crisis reaches a Karachi petrol pump.

I can stand at a petrol station in Karachi and see nothing that resembles a war.

Motorcycles crowd around the pumps. Cars edge forward. An attendant watches the meter and asks for payment. Another customer checks his phone before filling his motorcycle.

Yet the price of that fuel is being shaped by events more than a thousand kilometres away.

A tanker attacked near the Strait of Hormuz does not have to be carrying Pakistani oil. Iran does not need to achieve a total shutdown of the waterway. Pakistan does not have to fire a shot.

For Pakistan, this is no longer a risk scenario.

The transmission has already begun.

Visible commercial traffic through Hormuz has collapsed from normal pre-war levels. Reuters reported only 17 commodity-vessel crossings during the weekend of September 19-20, compared with 37 the previous weekend. Before the conflict began on February 28, roughly 125 large commercial vessels normally crossed each day. Some vessels are apparently travelling without normal tracking, so visible traffic does not capture everything moving through the strait.

Then came a detail that should interest every Pakistani.

The Shandong Redwood, carrying LNG loaded at Qatar’s Ras Laffan terminal, passed through Hormuz on September 19.

Its destination was Pakistan.

Suddenly Hormuz is not an abstract line on a geopolitical map. It is part of Pakistan’s energy supply chain.

Hormuz Is Not Operating Normally

For years, discussion about Hormuz followed a familiar script. Iran threatens the strait. Oil markets become nervous. Analysts debate whether Tehran can close it. Eventually attention shifts elsewhere.

The present crisis is different.

The useful distinction is no longer simply between an open strait and a closed one. Normal commercial movement has been severely disrupted, while energy continues to move through extraordinary arrangements.

Before the conflict, roughly one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption moved through Hormuz. The waterway also handled around a quarter of internationally traded LNG, making disruption there a problem far beyond the Gulf, according to the IMF.

The scale of the change is extraordinary.

The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that total oil flows through Hormuz fell from 21.6 million barrels per day in the fourth quarter of 2025 to 4.9 million barrels per day during the second quarter of 2026. LNG flows dropped from 10.5 billion cubic feet per day to 0.8 billion.

Yet oil has not stopped moving completely. The industry has improvised.

Tankers perform ship-to-ship transfers outside the strait. Some vessels shuttle crude through dangerous waters and transfer their cargo near Oman. Other movements may occur without normal AIS tracking.

September oil exports through Hormuz recovered to around 6.5 million barrels per day through these unusual arrangements, according to Reuters.

It works.

It is also expensive.

Reuters reported benchmark freight rates above $30 per barrel for a very large crude carrier moving Gulf oil to China. Before the war, freight represented only a small fraction of the delivered cost.

That distinction matters for Pakistan.

We often watch Brent crude as though it were the petrol-pump price written in another currency. It isn’t.

Pakistan ultimately pays for delivered energy. Freight charges rise. Insurance becomes more expensive, while a regional risk premium can push the delivered price higher still.

A barrel does not become cheap merely because it survives the journey.

Pakistan Cannot Declare Economic Neutrality

Pakistan can try to remain outside a regional war.

Its import bill cannot.

The IMF put the exposure rather starkly in its April 2026 assessment. Pakistan is a net importer of oil and gas, leaving the economy particularly vulnerable to a Middle Eastern energy shock.

More strikingly, the IMF estimated that 81 percent of Pakistan’s fuel imports came from Gulf Cooperation Council suppliers. It also found Pakistan was being affected not only by higher international energy prices but by regional premiums above international benchmarks, particularly for refined petroleum products.

There is the mechanism.

Pakistan does not have to lose access to every Gulf cargo. The cargo merely has to become more expensive.

The State Bank recognised the seriousness of the situation in April. It changed foreign-exchange procedures to facilitate imports of crude oil, petroleum products and LNG amid the geopolitical disruption.

Pakistan’s dependence on imported energy is hardly new.

The State Bank’s annual report noted that even when the country’s energy import bill fell by 5.8 percent in FY2025, petroleum import volumes remained broadly unchanged in recent years. It warned that import dependence increases the external account’s sensitivity to international energy prices.

March 2026 trade data gives some idea of the scale.

Pakistan imported about Rs181 billion of crude petroleum during that month. Petroleum products accounted for roughly another Rs116 billion, according to the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics.

A larger energy bill consumes more foreign exchange. If the wider shock also puts pressure on the rupee, the same dollar-priced cargo becomes still more expensive domestically.

Eventually the shock travels inland.

Hormuz Does Not Need a Total Shutdown

I think this is the part Pakistan needs to understand better.

We tend to imagine disruption as an on-off switch.

Strait open: safe.

Strait closed: crisis.

Shipping does not work like that.

A shipowner decides whether a voyage justifies the risk. The insurer puts a price on that danger. Traders then incorporate additional costs and possible delays into their decisions.

The market starts charging for insecurity long before every ship becomes physically incapable of passing.

On September 21, only two commodity vessels were visible crossing Hormuz, according to preliminary tracking data reported by Reuters. Two other vessels had recently been struck in separate incidents. Responsibility for those attacks had not been established when Reuters reported them.

Energy still moved. But normality did not return.

That distinction matters. Pakistan pays for the extraordinary measures that keep cargoes moving too.

LNG May Be the More Uncomfortable Story

Oil receives most of the headlines because everyone understands petrol. Gas deserves equal attention.

Qatar has historically been central to Asian LNG supply, including Pakistan’s. The Hormuz crisis has disrupted those flows, while attacks on Qatar’s Ras Laffan complex have damaged production capacity.

Reuters reported in September that Asian spot LNG prices had risen from a pre-war range of around $10 per million British thermal units to nearly $30. High prices pushed Asian buyers towards alternatives and suppressed demand among customers unable to absorb the increase.

Pakistan LNG CEO Masood Nabi told Reuters that Pakistani demand could recover if additional supplies brought prices back to affordable levels.

Pakistan still needs LNG. At nearly $30 per million BTU, however, need and affordability become two very different things.

Pakistan has partly reduced its vulnerability through rapid solar adoption, especially among electricity consumers able to generate some of their own power. Gas still matters elsewhere in the economy.

Qatar’s problem may also survive the shooting.

QatarEnergy said on September 21 that damage at Ras Laffan had knocked out 17 percent of the country’s LNG capacity. Repairs to two damaged LNG trains could take as long as three years. The company said disruption at Hormuz was also interfering with equipment deliveries for its North Field expansion.

Pakistan therefore faces uncertainty over physical supply and price. A cargo getting through Hormuz solves little if Pakistan cannot afford to buy enough of it.

The IMF Has Already Run the Stress Test

We do not need to manufacture frightening numbers.

The IMF has already modelled the economic transmission.

Under its April baseline, the Middle East conflict was expected to reduce Pakistan’s GDP growth by about 0.2 percentage points in FY2026 and 0.6 points in FY2027 compared with the pre-conflict baseline.

Average inflation was estimated to rise by roughly half a percentage point in FY2026 and 1.5 points in FY2027. The current-account balance was projected to deteriorate by around 0.2 percent of GDP in FY2026 and 0.4 percent in FY2027.

Its adverse scenario was considerably worse.

The IMF estimated a cumulative GDP hit of roughly 1.5 percentage points by FY2027. Current-account deterioration in FY2027 could reach around 1.5 percent of GDP relative to the pre-conflict baseline.

These numbers describe stress scenarios rather than certain outcomes, but the economic mechanism behind them is already visible.

We can see part of it at Pakistan’s petrol pumps.

Pakistan Is Already Subsidising the Shock

We do not have to speculate about whether higher energy costs will eventually force Islamabad to intervene.

It already has.

On September 14, the Economic Coordination Committee approved the Prime Minister’s Fuel Relief Scheme, with around Rs75 billion allocated for a three-month programme. The government linked the intervention to higher petroleum prices and designed it as targeted relief rather than a universal petrol subsidy. See the Ministry of Finance releases.

Motorcycle, rickshaw and Qingqi users can receive Rs500 in petrol relief each week, giving them up to Rs2,000 over four weekly tokens.

Owners of eligible non-commercial cars with engines of up to 800cc can receive Rs1,000 every ten days, based on Rs100-per-litre relief on 10 litres. The monthly ceiling is effectively 30 litres, or as much as Rs3,000 in relief.

One vehicle is allowed for each eligible owner or user.

The government subsequently changed some of the motorcycle rules after complaints. A rider no longer has to purchase five litres in a single transaction to receive the benefit. The eligible age of two- and three-wheelers was extended from 15 years to 20 years.

Another change is socially important. Motorcycle and rickshaw users of rented vehicles can now qualify without satisfying the original ownership requirement, Radio Pakistan reported.

By September 25, IT Minister Shaza Fatima Khawaja said more than 5.8 million people had registered. Around 6.1 million tokens had been generated, while approximately 4.7 million people had obtained fuel through the programme.

I find those numbers more revealing than another speech about international oil markets.

They show the transmission mechanism operating almost in real time.

A military confrontation disrupts Gulf energy flows. Pakistan pays more to keep energy moving towards its economy.

Then Islamabad pays again to shield selected consumers from part of the increase.

The missile may fall hundreds of kilometres from Karachi.

The subsidy is paid in rupees.

A Rs500 Token Does Not Make the Cost Disappear

A motorcycle in Karachi is often not discretionary transport. It takes a worker to his office. A delivery rider depends on it for his income. A father may simply need it to reach the market.

For someone using a motorcycle every day, Rs2,000 a month therefore matters. A family running an old 660cc or 800cc car can similarly gain some protection from expensive petrol.

But Pakistan still has to finance that protection.

The targeted fuel scheme was allocated around Rs75 billion for three months.

There is another government intervention that must be kept separate.

The ECC also approved a Rs100 billion technical supplementary grant for the Prime Minister’s Austerity Fund 2026. The government said the money would meet petroleum price-differential requirements and cushion consumers against price volatility associated with Gulf developments.

It is being financed through the rationalisation and surrender of Public Sector Development Programme funds.

The distinction matters. The Rs75 billion programme provides targeted fuel relief. The Rs100 billion allocation addresses broader petroleum-price volatility.

Neither makes the underlying imported energy cost disappear.

Part of the burden simply moves from the petrol pump towards the federal budget. When development funds help finance the response, another part can move into spending that no longer happens elsewhere.

Why Motorcycles Tell Us More Than SUVs

The government could have reduced the petrol price for everyone. It didn’t.

Instead, it targeted two- and three-wheelers and restricted eligible cars to engines no larger than 800cc. Someone filling a large SUV does not receive the same protection.

There is an economic logic behind the distinction.

A motorcycle in Karachi often represents basic mobility rather than discretionary consumption. Subsidising the fuel used by a worker commuting across the city is economically different from subsidising the petrol bill of a large SUV.

That does not mean every motorcycle owner is poor. Nor does targeting guarantee perfect delivery.

A vehicle record may not match an applicant’s details. Even a problem with a registered mobile number can interfere with access. Poor connectivity has caused difficulties in some areas as well.

The government has already had to adjust parts of the programme.

Still, its basic structure tells us something.

Pakistan is trying to protect smaller consumers without completely insulating the domestic economy from international energy prices.

The motorcycle subsidy is therefore not a separate welfare story sitting somewhere below the geopolitical headlines. It is one consequence of those headlines.

Islamabad Is Also Trying to Burn Less Fuel

Subsidies are only one side of the government’s response.

On September 17, Pakistan announced austerity measures intended to conserve fuel as the Gulf conflict intensified. The measures included restrictions on fuel use by official vehicles and limits on government vehicle purchases, Reuters reported.

The combination is revealing.

Islamabad is trying to protect selected household consumers while reducing fuel use inside government.

That is not the behaviour of a country facing a theoretical problem. It is the behaviour of a government responding to an energy shock that has already arrived.

Whether these measures save enough fuel or public money is a separate question. Their existence tells us something more immediate about the severity of Pakistan’s exposure.

Hormuz is already influencing domestic policy.

From a Tanker in Hormuz to a Motorcycle in Karachi

Consider the distance between the two ends of this story.

A tanker approaches Hormuz. Its owner considers the danger. The insurer recalculates risk.

Pakistan then needs dollars to pay for energy whose journey has become more difficult and expensive.

Eventually, one morning, a man rides his motorcycle into a Karachi petrol station. He uses a government fuel-relief token because petrol has become painfully expensive.

At first glance, the tanker and the motorcycle have nothing to do with each other.

Economically, they are connected.

I began at a Karachi petrol station because that is where this distant war becomes easier to see.

Pakistan is not fighting Iran. The motorcyclist filling his tank did not create the crisis in Hormuz either. Yet the cost has travelled from a Gulf shipping lane into Pakistan’s budget and, eventually, towards his pocket.

Islamabad can soften that journey with a Rs500 token.

It cannot make the underlying cost disappear.

A complete shutdown of Hormuz would be far worse.

Pakistan does not need one to suffer. The war has already entered our economy without asking permission.

Did Mohammed bin Salman Clash With His Brother? What We Can Actually Verify

Saudi opposition sources claim Mohammed bin Salman and Defence Minister Khalid bin Salman are locked in a serious dispute over Saudi Arabia’s failures against the Houthis. The alleged confrontation remains unverified, but the military crisis beneath the rumour is real.

Late this week, an extraordinary story began circulating through Saudi opposition channels. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the story claimed, had turned furiously against his younger brother, Defence Minister Khalid bin Salman.

The allegation went much further than an ordinary disagreement. According to versions circulating online, Mohammed bin Salman accused Khalid of failing to build a military capable of defeating Yemen’s Houthis despite enormous defence expenditure. Some versions allege accusations of corruption and embezzlement. Khalid supposedly answered that the real mistake belonged to Mohammed himself because he had taken Saudi Arabia into the Yemen war.

It is explosive material. There is just one problem. I cannot verify that confrontation happened.

What I can verify is something arguably more important. Saudi Arabia is facing a serious military challenge from the Houthis, missiles and drones are again threatening the kingdom, questions are being asked about Saudi military effectiveness, and Washington has shown limits to the support Riyadh can expect.

What the Saudi opposition story actually claims

One version of the allegation, citing reports from the Saudi opposition, says the relationship between Mohammed and Khalid bin Salman has deteriorated into a serious dispute. It claims Mohammed blamed his brother for failing to construct an effective military force against Ansar Allah, the formal name used by the Houthi movement.

The same account alleges that Mohammed accused Khalid of administrative corruption and misappropriation of money. Khalid supposedly replied that weapons and money could not repair strategic mistakes made when Mohammed led Saudi policy toward Yemen.

Those are enormous accusations. Yet the published versions provide no documents establishing the exchange, no recording, and no independently attributable palace source who witnessed it.

An opposition source can sometimes reveal information that official media will never publish. Closed political systems create precisely this verification problem. Official silence cannot prove an allegation false. But opposition status does not make an allegation true either. For now, the alleged confrontation should be described as unverified.

Something real is happening underneath the rumour

The security situation is much easier to establish. On 26 September, the Saudi-led coalition said it intercepted two ballistic missiles heading toward Khamis Mushait and two drones heading toward the Riyadh region. Reuters reported the coalition’s announcement.

Recent reporting has also documented Houthi advances and weaknesses among Saudi-backed forces in Yemen. Intelligence failures, divisions among local allies and underestimation of Houthi preparations have all featured in accounts of the setback. The opposition rumour therefore lands in a political environment already filled with questions about deterrence and military performance.

That does not prove a royal fight. It explains why the allegation has acquired such force.

Saudi Arabia has spent heavily on defence

Saudi military expenditure makes the controversy sharper. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that Saudi Arabia spent $83.2 billion on its military in 2025, making the kingdom one of the world’s largest military spenders.

So asking why a state with expensive aircraft, missiles and sophisticated Western weapons still struggles to deter the Houthis is legitimate. But expenditure cannot answer that question by itself.

Saudi difficulties in Yemen involve intelligence and command arrangements. Terrain matters enormously. So does the effectiveness of local allies and the Houthis’ accumulated combat experience. The important distinction is between possessing advanced weapons and converting them into political control on a difficult battlefield.

Saudi Arabia can destroy targets from the air. Holding territory and producing a durable political settlement in Yemen require something different. That problem has followed Riyadh for more than a decade.

There is an awkward historical problem with blaming Khalid

The circulating allegation contains a weakness that should immediately interest anyone familiar with the history of the Yemen war. Khalid bin Salman did not start it as Saudi defence minister.

Mohammed bin Salman was defence minister when Saudi Arabia launched its military intervention in Yemen in March 2015. Riyadh intervened after the Houthis had driven the internationally recognised government from Sanaa and expanded their territorial control.

Khalid became defence minister only in September 2022. The Saudi Press Agency’s record of the royal appointment states that King Salman appointed Mohammed bin Salman prime minister and Khalid bin Salman defence minister on 27 September 2022.

That chronology does not tell us whether the brothers are arguing today. It does tell us something important about responsibility. Saudi Arabia’s Yemen strategy cannot simply be attributed to Khalid’s management of the Defence Ministry. Mohammed was central to the original intervention and has remained the kingdom’s dominant political decision-maker.

A genuine internal Saudi reckoning over Yemen would therefore involve more than procurement or the performance of one minister. It would eventually reach the strategic decisions made in 2015.

Yet Khalid does not look like a minister who has been pushed aside

There is another problem with the most dramatic versions of the rumour. Khalid bin Salman remains publicly active in highly sensitive defence business.

On Saudi National Day, he publicly praised the leadership of King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Whatever may happen privately inside the royal family, his public language showed no political separation from his brother.

More important, Khalid has continued meeting senior foreign military officials as the Houthi crisis has intensified. These are not merely ceremonial duties. They place him at the centre of Saudi Arabia’s response to a live security problem.

None of this proves that relations between the brothers are harmonious. Governments routinely conceal internal disputes. Brothers can disagree bitterly while continuing to work together. But observable evidence matters. If Khalid had lost Mohammed’s confidence completely, his continued role in sensitive defence diplomacy would require explanation. At present, the public evidence points to continuity.

The deeper crisis may concern America

There is another figure hovering over this story: Donald Trump. Saudi Arabia spent decades building its security architecture around its relationship with the United States. The current Houthi crisis is testing what that relationship actually guarantees.

Recent reporting has described Saudi frustration with Washington’s reluctance to become more deeply involved militarily against the Houthis. The Financial Times has examined that tension.

This changes the strategic calculation inside Riyadh. The kingdom must calculate how much American military support it can expect when a regional crisis threatens Saudi interests but Washington does not consider direct intervention worthwhile.

I suspect this question matters far more than palace gossip.

Why rumours flourish inside closed political systems

Saudi Arabia presents journalists with an unusual verification problem. Major decisions emerge from a narrow ruling structure. Independent reporting on internal royal deliberations is difficult, while officials rarely discuss disagreements publicly.

The information vacuum produces two competing temptations. One is to believe Saudi official media too easily. The other is to believe Saudi opposition media simply because official Saudi media cannot be trusted to disclose internal conflict. Neither method works.

A serious reader should ask who originated the allegation and what direct evidence that source possesses. Has another source independently confirmed it? Do subsequent appointments, dismissals or changes in responsibility support the story?

In this case, those tests produce an uncomfortable but useful answer. I can verify the Saudi security crisis. I can verify the enormous defence expenditure. I can verify renewed Houthi attacks. I can also verify that Khalid remains publicly active as defence minister. I cannot verify the alleged private confrontation between the brothers.

That is not the same as proving that it never happened.

The story worth watching

I would therefore watch Khalid bin Salman rather than the rumour. Does he continue meeting foreign military leaders? Does responsibility for Yemen move elsewhere? Do senior commanders disappear from public view? Does Saudi Arabia restructure its defence establishment?

Concrete changes of that kind would provide evidence of political consequences.

For now, Saudi Arabia’s larger predicament is serious enough without embellishment. A movement Riyadh went to war against in 2015 remains capable of launching missiles and drones toward Saudi targets more than eleven years later. Saudi Arabia spent $83.2 billion on its military last year, yet the Houthi challenge continues to expose questions about intelligence, command and deterrence.

Washington, meanwhile, has shown limits to what it will do for Riyadh.

Perhaps Mohammed bin Salman and Khalid bin Salman are arguing about all of this behind palace walls. It would hardly be surprising if Saudi leaders were conducting a severe internal review after military setbacks.

But surprise is not evidence.

The more revealing question is already in front of us. After more than a decade of war, enormous military expenditure and deep dependence on foreign security partnerships, why is Saudi Arabia once again struggling to deter the Houthis?

Whatever is being said inside the royal palace, Riyadh now has to answer that question outside it.

Pakistanis Think the Migration Door Is Closing. The Truth Is More Uncomfortable

Pakistani professionals can hold recognised degrees and approved skills assessments yet wait years for migration opportunities. Australia, Canada and Germany still need foreign talent, but official data reveal a shift toward specific skills, experience and labour-market fit.

A few days ago, I was listening to the familiar Pakistani discussion about migration. Britain is becoming tougher. Canada is cutting immigration. Australia has become difficult. Germany no longer offers the easy professional future many young people imagined.

Then I thought about my own son.

He is an engineer. He went through the professional assessment process for Australia and received a positive assessment from Engineers Australia. Yet years have passed without the immigration outcome we once imagined would follow from being a qualified engineer.

That experience forced me to ask a different question. What if the migration door has not simply closed? What if countries such as Australia and Canada are still looking for immigrants, but have become much more precise about which immigrants they want, where they need them and how quickly those migrants can contribute?

A Qualified Engineer Is Not Necessarily an Invited Engineer

Australia provides perhaps the clearest example. Engineers Australia is authorised to assess qualifications, skills and experience for engineering migration occupations. A successful assessment is important, but Engineers Australia does not award migration points. Visa decisions belong to the Department of Home Affairs.

Australia’s SkillSelect system makes the distinction even clearer. A person interested in Skilled Independent subclass 189, Skilled Nominated subclass 190 or Skilled Work Regional subclass 491 first submits an Expression of Interest. The formal threshold is 65 points, but Home Affairs explicitly warns that reaching the threshold does not guarantee an invitation.

Competition matters. In Australia’s published invitation-round data, some occupations required substantially more than 65 points. In the latest published table available when I checked, Chemical Engineer required 85 points. Civil Engineering Draftsperson and Construction Project Manager were also at 85. The exact score varies by occupation and round.

A Pakistani family can therefore truthfully say, “Our son is a professionally assessed engineer.” Australia can simultaneously say, “We have not invited him.” Both statements can be correct.

Australia Still Wants Skilled Migrants

This is where the popular narrative starts to break down. Australia has not abandoned skilled migration.

For 2026–27, the permanent migration program is set at 185,000 places. Skilled migration accounts for 132,240. The Skilled Independent category rises to 21,090 places, while employer-sponsored migration receives 58,040 places.

Those numbers do not describe a country that has stopped wanting skilled migrants. They describe a country making choices about how migration connects to its labour market. The government also says the 2026–27 program will prioritise migrants already living in Australia.

Qualification remains important. Connection to actual demand may matter even more.

A Shortage Does Not Mean Every Applicant Is Needed

I often hear Pakistanis say, “My occupation is in shortage in Australia, so why am I not getting immigration?” The question sounds reasonable. It rests on a faulty assumption.

A shortage does not mean every qualified overseas applicant is required. The 2025 Occupation Shortage List found that 29 percent of assessed occupations were in shortage, down from 33 percent in 2024 and 36 percent in 2023. Shortages persisted particularly in health and construction.

Jobs and Skills Australia also reported an important problem in some professional occupations, including engineering: employers could encounter gaps in employability skills and experience even among qualified candidates.

Pause over that finding. The problem is not always an absence of degrees. Employers may find qualified people without enough of the particular experience or workplace capability they require.

The Plumber and the MBA

This brings me to an uncomfortable Pakistani habit. A university degree carries enormous social prestige. Parents proudly say their son is an engineer, doctor or MBA. Skilled manual work occupies a different social position. A plumber does not usually receive the same admiration at a Karachi family gathering.

International labour markets have no obligation to respect our hierarchy.

Canada demonstrates the point. Its 2026 Express Entry category-based selection includes healthcare and social services, STEM occupations and trades among targeted categories. The trade category includes electricians, plumbers, carpenters and welders. It also covers heavy-duty equipment mechanics and heating, refrigeration and air-conditioning mechanics.

Engineers have not disappeared. Canada’s STEM category includes civil, mechanical, electrical and electronics engineers among other occupations.

The lesson is not “forget university and become a plumber.” That would replace one simplistic migration formula with another. The more useful conclusion is this: a profession’s social prestige in Pakistan tells us very little about its migration value overseas.

Germany Shows What AI Is Doing to the Equation

Germany adds another layer. I recently saw a comment from a Pakistani woman whose husband was completing a master’s degree in Germany. He had IT experience from his student years, she said, yet he was struggling to find even a junior-level job. One comment proves nothing about an entire labour market.

German government data, however, show why the experience is plausible. Germany’s Federal Employment Agency reported in July 2026 that registered ICT vacancies had fallen 22 percent in 2025. ICT unemployment rose from 3.7 percent to 4.5 percent.

Yet Germany still employed about 1.15 million ICT professionals subject to social-security contributions, and foreign ICT specialists numbered about 171,000 in 2025. Germany can therefore need foreign technology workers while a particular international graduate struggles to find a junior job.

AI helps explain part of the tension. The Federal Employment Agency says digitalisation, automation and AI are raising skill requirements in ICT. More than 40 percent of the 39,000 new ICT jobs identified in its analysis were for experts.

Germany has not stopped needing technology workers. It increasingly needs workers who can perform at a higher level.

Migration Is Becoming a Matching System

I think we have been asking the wrong question in Pakistan. We ask: Which country is easy for immigration? That encourages people to chase countries.

A more useful question is: Where does my particular combination of occupation, experience and language ability match demand strongly enough for an employer or government to choose me?

Australia’s latest policies make that logic visible. From 19 September 2026, its skilled-visa processing priorities give priority to applications connected with sectors including construction, healthcare and teaching. Agriculture and resources are also included.

Canada selects occupational categories around economic goals and labour-market information. Germany still wants foreign ICT expertise while technological change raises what employers expect. These are different systems, but each illustrates a basic pressure: governments increasingly want migration to solve identifiable labour-market problems.

What About the Pakistani Passport?

Here we need discipline. Online discussions quickly move from labour shortages to claims about Pakistanis submitting fake degrees, abusing asylum systems, committing crimes overseas or refusing to integrate.

Individual cases do not establish population-wide behaviour. Nor does a YouTube comment establish that Pakistani Americans avoid taxes, that Pakistanis are uniquely difficult to integrate, or that criminal behaviour by Pakistanis explains a particular country’s immigration policy. Those claims require comparative evidence.

I found much stronger official evidence for another explanation: governments are adjusting immigration systems around labour demand, program capacity and domestic economic priorities. That explanation is less sensational. It is also more useful.

My Son’s Experience Changed How I Read the System

When I look at my son’s experience now, I see it differently. A positive Engineers Australia assessment remains valuable. It establishes professional recognition for migration purposes.

But professional recognition answers one question: Are you appropriately qualified in the nominated engineering occupation?

SkillSelect asks another: Are you competitive enough to be invited under the migration settings operating now?

The labour market asks something harder still: Does an Australian employer need what you can do?

Those questions are not interchangeable. There is also a practical warning for anyone who has been waiting for years. An Australian SkillSelect EOI remains active for two years and is then archived. Applicants can update an active EOI when circumstances change.

Pakistan Needs a Different Migration Conversation

I would not tell a young Pakistani that foreign migration is finished. The evidence does not support that conclusion.

But I would no longer tell a young person that getting the right degree is enough. Before spending millions of rupees on foreign education, investigate official labour data. Check the exact occupation rather than the broad industry. Study the immigration route separately from the university-admission route.

Then ask the uncomfortable question: what evidence can I show that I can actually do the work?

A degree proves education. A professional assessment proves something else. An immigration invitation is another test entirely. An employer willing to pay for your skills may be the strongest market signal of all.

For Pakistani families, that may be the real migration shock of 2026.

The door has not disappeared. But the key we spent years polishing may no longer fit every lock.

EES 2026: What Pakistani Travellers to Europe Need to Know About Fingerprints, Facial Scans and the 90-Day Rule

Europe’s Entry/Exit System is now fully operational. Here is what Pakistani short-stay travellers need to know about biometric border checks, passport stamps, the 90/180-day rule, exemptions and ETIAS.

I know the old routine well. A Pakistani traveller leaves Karachi with a passport, a Schengen visa, hotel details or a family invitation tucked into the hand luggage. After landing in Europe, the decisive moment comes at passport control: a border officer checks the documents, asks a few questions and, if everything is in order, stamps the passport.

That familiar stamp has largely disappeared for short-stay visitors entering the Schengen area.

Europe’s Entry/Exit System (EES) became fully operational on 10 April 2026 after a phased rollout that began in October 2025. For eligible non-EU travellers, the external Schengen border is now a digital border. The system records travel-document details, biometric information, and the date and place of entry and exit. It also records refusals of entry.

For Pakistanis making short visits to Europe, this is more than a technical change at immigration. The EES creates a digital travel history that makes the old passport-stamp arithmetic far less important. It can identify overstays automatically. It can also make previous refusals visible to border authorities using the system.

What exactly has changed at the European border?

The EES covers non-EU nationals travelling for a short stay in the 29 European countries using the system. A short stay normally means no more than 90 days in any 180-day period across the countries concerned. The Council of the European Union explains that the system replaces manual passport stamping with electronic registration.

Suppose you fly from Karachi to Munich on a short-stay Schengen visa. Munich is your first external Schengen border. Your EES interaction happens there. If you later travel from Germany to France or Italy, you normally do not repeat an external-border registration simply because you crossed an internal Schengen border.

At the external border, EES can record your name and passport details, the place and date of entry, a facial image and required fingerprint data. When you leave, the exit is recorded as well. On later journeys, border officials can verify the biometric information already associated with your file rather than creating an entirely new identity record each time.

The European Commission says the system had already registered more than 145 million entries and exits by July 2026. It is therefore no longer a future proposal or a trial that Pakistani travellers can ignore. It is part of the operating border system.

Does EES mean every Pakistani will be fingerprinted?

No. This point needs care because headlines can easily overstate the rule.

EES generally applies to Pakistani nationals making eligible short stays because Pakistani citizens require a Schengen visa. But important exemptions exist. The European Commission’s July 2026 guidance says non-EU nationals holding a qualifying long-stay visa or residence permit issued by a country operating EES are generally not registered in the system. Certain non-EU family members of EU or associated-country citizens who hold the relevant residence documentation are also exempt.

Children under 12 are exempt from the requirement to provide fingerprints under the EES regulation. That does not mean the system simply ignores a child travelling on a short stay. Other applicable identity and entry information can still be recorded.

The practical lesson is simple: do not assume that “Pakistani passport” alone determines the procedure. Your immigration status and the type of document under which you travel matter.

The 90-days-in-180 rule has not disappeared

I expect this to become the most important part of EES for frequent Pakistani visitors, particularly parents visiting children in Germany, France or other Schengen countries.

EES does not give you extra days in Europe. It helps authorities calculate the days more accurately.

For an ordinary short stay, the familiar limit remains up to 90 days in any rolling 180-day period. The European Commission provides an official short-stay calculator to help travellers check compliance.

Under the old system, travellers often looked through passport stamps and counted days themselves. That could become confusing after several visits. EES digitally records entries and exits and is designed to detect people who exceed their authorised stay.

That makes casual assumptions dangerous. A multiple-entry visa valid for one year does not automatically mean that its holder can remain in the Schengen area for a full year. Visa validity, the authorised duration of stay and the 90/180 calculation are separate issues. Travellers should check the conditions printed on the visa and their actual travel history.

A valid Schengen visa still does not guarantee admission

This part has not changed merely because the border has become digital.

A visa allows you to travel to the border and request entry. Border authorities still apply the Schengen entry rules. They can ask about the purpose of the visit and supporting arrangements. A traveller may need to show evidence appropriate to the trip, such as accommodation details, an invitation, a return or onward journey, or sufficient means for the stay.

The EES also records refusals of entry. The European Commission reported in March 2026 that during the rollout more than 24,000 people had been refused entry for reasons including inadequate justification of their visit and expired or fraudulent documents. It said EES records can allow authorities in another participating country to see a previous refusal.

For a genuine visitor, the sensible response is not fear. It is consistency. Your visa application, stated purpose at the border and supporting documents should tell the same story.

What happens to the passport stamp?

For travellers registered through EES, the digital entry and exit record replaces the routine manual stamp used to track a short stay. The Commission states that EES has replaced passport stamping at external borders for travellers covered by the system.

Some travellers may miss the stamps. They were useful souvenirs, and I have often looked at old passports to reconstruct journeys. Administratively, however, the European system is moving in the opposite direction. The border record now sits in a database rather than on a page that a traveller can misread, lose with an old passport or present under a different identity.

EES is not ETIAS

This confusion is already producing poor travel advice online.

EES and ETIAS are different systems. EES is the border-registration system already operating. ETIAS is a travel authorisation for nationals of countries that can visit the relevant European countries without a short-stay visa. The European Commission says ETIAS is scheduled to start in the last quarter of 2026, with the precise date to be announced officially.

Pakistani citizens normally require a Schengen visa for short visits. ETIAS therefore does not replace the Schengen visa for an ordinary Pakistani passport holder. EES, by contrast, does affect eligible Pakistani short-stay visitors when they cross an external border.

If somebody tells a Pakistani traveller to “apply for ETIAS instead of a Schengen visa,” treat that advice with suspicion.

What should you prepare before leaving Karachi?

The introduction of EES does not require an ordinary Pakistani short-stay visa holder to complete some new EES application before boarding the aircraft. Registration takes place in connection with the external border crossing.

Your preparation should instead focus on the journey you are actually making. Check that your passport and visa are valid for the intended trip. Keep the documents that support the purpose of your visit readily accessible rather than buried in checked baggage. Know where you will stay and how long you intend to remain. If you have made several recent Schengen trips, calculate your remaining allowance before departure rather than relying on memory.

Travellers visiting relatives should also understand the difference between sponsorship and admission. An invitation from a daughter, son or other relative can support the purpose and financing of a trip, but it does not abolish border checks. The immigration officer still applies the entry rules to the traveller standing at the counter.

The EU Delegation to Pakistan has specifically informed Pakistani travellers about the EES rollout and directs travellers to the official European system for details. That is a better source than viral WhatsApp messages or travel-agent claims about supposed new “European permits.”

The deeper change is accountability

When I look at EES from Karachi, the fingerprint scanner is not the most interesting part.

The real change is that Europe’s external border is becoming less dependent on what can be inferred from ink in a passport. The system links identity, biometrics and travel movements in a digital record. According to the EU, one purpose is to identify overstayers more efficiently and make identity fraud harder.

That can help legitimate travellers too. A properly recorded exit provides evidence that a visitor left within the authorised period. Subsequent border crossings can use biometric verification against an existing record. The Commission presents this as both a security measure and a way to make later checks more efficient.

Still, digital borders deserve scrutiny. Biometric systems hold highly sensitive personal information, and European law sets rules governing access, retention and data protection. Travellers should understand that the convenience of losing the passport stamp comes with a much more systematic record of movement.

For Pakistani travellers, the old border habit is over

A Pakistani family landing in Munich today may still see the same immigration booths and the same queue signs. The officer may ask familiar questions. Yet the machinery behind that encounter has changed.

Europe now records eligible short-stay entries and exits electronically. It can calculate overstays without relying on a collection of stamps. Biometrics make it harder to separate a traveller’s identity from previous border encounters.

None of this should alarm a Pakistani traveller who has a genuine visit, valid documents and a clear travel history. It should change one habit, though.

Do not think of a Schengen journey only in terms of obtaining the visa.

The visa gets you to Europe’s door. EES increasingly records what happens when you cross it, and when you come back out.

Can Lifestyle Changes Slow Muscle Loss as We Age? What the Evidence Says About Sarcopenia

Age-related muscle loss is not inevitable at a fixed rate. Current evidence shows how resistance training, adequate nutrition and earlier attention to muscle health can help preserve strength and function as we age.

I notice muscle loss most clearly in ordinary movements. A staircase feels steeper. Rising from a low chair takes a little more effort. A shopping bag that once seemed light suddenly asks more from the arms. None of these changes proves that a person has sarcopenia, but they point toward something we often underestimate: ageing is not only about wrinkles or grey hair. It also changes the machinery that keeps us independent.

The encouraging part is that the decline is not completely fixed. Lifestyle cannot stop biological ageing, and it cannot guarantee that sarcopenia will never develop. Yet exercise and adequate nutrition can materially influence muscle strength and function. The strongest evidence points to resistance training, supported by sufficient food and protein.

Muscle loss is not simply a number on the scale

Sarcopenia is a progressive disorder involving skeletal muscle. Older explanations often treated it mainly as a loss of muscle mass. Clinical thinking has changed. The European Working Group on Sarcopenia in Older People placed particular emphasis on low muscle strength, using low muscle quantity or quality to confirm the diagnosis and poor physical performance to indicate severe disease.

That distinction matters. A bathroom scale cannot tell us whether an older person can rise safely from a chair or recover balance after a stumble. Two people of similar weight may have very different levels of muscle strength. Muscle health is about what the body can do, not simply how much it weighs.

The Asian Working Group for Sarcopenia 2025 consensus update pushes the argument further. It adopts a life-course approach to muscle health and extends diagnostic consideration into middle age, including adults aged 50 to 64. Its framework requires concurrent low muscle mass and low muscle strength for sarcopenia, while physical performance is treated as an outcome measure. For Asian readers, this is an important shift. Muscle health deserves attention before someone reaches old age.

Why I would remove the old percentage rules

Older health articles often say that people lose a fixed percentage of muscle or strength every year after middle age. Such figures are attractive because they are easy to remember. They are also easy to misuse.

Age-related decline varies considerably. Physical activity matters. Illness, periods of bed rest and nutritional status can alter the trajectory. The method used to measure muscle also changes the result. A universal annual percentage can therefore make normal ageing sound like a timetable.

Modern diagnostic frameworks do not decide that a person has sarcopenia because he or she has reached a certain birthday or supposedly lost a predetermined percentage of muscle. Clinicians use measures such as grip strength, chair-stand performance and assessments of muscle quantity according to the relevant framework. The important question becomes more practical: is muscle strength or mass low enough to affect health and function?

Resistance training has the strongest case

If I had to identify the central correction to the old article, it would be this: general advice to “stay active” is not specific enough. Walking is valuable. It supports cardiovascular health and mobility. But walking and resistance training do not place the same demand on muscle.

The International Clinical Practice Guidelines for Sarcopenia strongly recommend resistance-based physical activity for treatment. A later review of resistance-exercise prescription explains the importance of progressive overload: muscle must face an appropriate resistance and, as capacity improves, the challenge must progress. Resistance can come from weights, machines, elastic bands or body weight.

This does not mean an older beginner should walk into a gym and immediately lift heavy weights. Technique matters. So does progression. A person who has been inactive, has significant joint problems or lives with cardiovascular or other chronic disease may need professional advice before increasing exercise intensity.

Simple movements can still be meaningful. Repeated chair stands train muscles used every time we get up. Resistance-band exercises can provide load without a large home gym. The objective is not bodybuilding. It is preserving enough strength to continue doing ordinary things without unnecessary dependence.

Walking still matters, but it does a different job

I would not tell an older reader to abandon walking. That would miss the wider health picture. Regular walking supports endurance and daily mobility, while physical activity helps counter the inactivity that often accelerates functional decline.

But a daily walk should not automatically be treated as a complete muscle-preservation programme. If the goal includes maintaining strength, some form of progressive resistance exercise deserves a place alongside aerobic activity. The distinction is especially important for people who assume that being generally busy around the house provides all the muscular stimulus they need.

Protein helps, but more is not automatically better

Muscle also needs nutritional support. Protein provides amino acids used in muscle protein synthesis, and inadequate food intake can become a serious problem in older age. Appetite may fall. Dental problems or illness can reduce intake. Someone may therefore be losing weight and muscle without deliberately dieting.

The Asian Working Group for Sarcopenia’s nutrition consensus emphasizes adequate nutrition as part of muscle-health management. Evidence also suggests that combining resistance exercise with protein support can improve muscle outcomes in people with sarcopenia. A systematic review and meta-analysis of community-dwelling older adults found improvements in muscle mass and strength when protein supplementation was combined with resistance exercise, although the authors noted the limited number of trials.

Protein advice still needs context. Requirements vary with body size, total diet and medical circumstances. Kidney disease is one reason not to turn a population recommendation into a personal high-protein prescription without medical advice. Supplements can be useful in selected cases, but ordinary protein-rich foods may already provide what many people need.

The real danger may be the inactivity cycle

Muscle loss can become self-reinforcing. A person feels weaker, so movement becomes uncomfortable. Activity then falls. Lower activity gives the muscles less reason to remain strong, and daily tasks can become harder still.

Illness can accelerate the problem. A hospital admission or a prolonged period in bed can remove much of the normal loading that muscles receive during daily life. Recovery should therefore concern function as well as the disease that caused the admission. Being medically stable is not always the same as having regained previous physical capacity.

The latest 2026 rehabilitation guideline for older adults with sarcopenia reflects this broader approach. It covers assessment and prevention as well as exercise and nutrition, underlining that sarcopenia management is not a single-food or single-exercise problem.

Middle age is a better time to think about muscle

I find the 2025 Asian consensus particularly useful because it changes the timing of the conversation. We should not wait until an older person is visibly frail before discussing muscle health. The inclusion of ages 50 to 64 in the updated framework recognizes that the foundations of later-life function are built earlier.

For someone in middle age, the practical lesson is not to become anxious about every change in strength. It is to treat muscle as an organ worth maintaining. Regular resistance exercise becomes part of preventive health rather than a cosmetic project.

When weakness deserves medical attention

Not every case of weakness is sarcopenia. Sudden or marked weakness can have other causes, and unexplained weight loss deserves assessment. Repeated falls, increasing difficulty rising from a chair or a clear decline in walking ability should not simply be dismissed as “getting old.”

A clinician can look for contributing illness and review nutrition, medications and physical function. Formal sarcopenia assessment may include strength testing and measurement of muscle mass. The purpose is not to attach a frightening label. It is to identify a potentially modifiable problem before loss of function becomes harder to recover.

Age changes muscle, but age does not write the whole story

The old way of describing sarcopenia made ageing sound almost mechanical: reach a certain age, lose a predictable percentage of muscle, then accept the decline. The evidence now gives us a more useful picture.

Age matters, but so does the stimulus we give our muscles. Resistance training can improve strength and physical function, while adequate nutrition supports the biological work behind those adaptations. Neither is a guarantee against sarcopenia. Both give people something practical to act on.

I return to the staircase. The aim is not to make a 70-year-old body behave as if it were 30. It is to preserve enough strength for that staircase, that chair and the ordinary movements that keep life independent. Muscle health is built quietly, long before we notice how much we need it.

Medical note: This article provides general health information and is not a substitute for individual medical advice. People with chronic disease, significant mobility limitations or unexplained weakness should discuss major changes in exercise or diet with an appropriate healthcare professional.

Your Karachi Flight May Leave on Time. Your Gulf Connection Is Now the Risk.

Middle East airspace tensions are changing the risks for Pakistani travellers connecting through Dubai, Doha and Abu Dhabi. The airports remain open, but delays, rerouting and sudden cancellations mean passengers should pay closer attention to connections, ticket protection and travel insurance.

A traveller can stand at Karachi airport, look at the departure board and see exactly what he wants to see: On Time.

His flight to Dubai is operating. His passport is ready. His luggage has been checked in. Somewhere in his hand luggage sits the boarding pass for the second flight to Europe.

I used to think that once the first flight left Karachi, most of the uncertainty was over.

In the Middle East of September 2026, I would no longer make that assumption.

Dubai and Abu Dhabi airports remain operational. Gulf airlines continue to fly large networks. Yet cancellations, lengthy delays and route changes have appeared across the region as airlines respond to security developments, airspace risks and regulatory restrictions.

For Pakistani passengers, the important question is therefore changing.

It is no longer simply: Is my flight from Karachi operating?

It is also: What happens to my journey after I reach the Gulf?

The Gulf Hub Made International Travel Easier for Pakistan

For decades, geography has worked in Pakistan’s favour.

Karachi sits only a relatively short flight from the Gulf. Dubai, Doha and Abu Dhabi turned that proximity into an enormous international transport advantage. A passenger from Pakistan could reach a Gulf hub and connect onwards to Europe, North America or Africa without relying on a Pakistani airline to operate the entire journey.

The model works because the hub behaves almost like a giant railway interchange in the sky.

Aircraft arrive from dozens of cities. Passengers change planes. The airline then redistributes them across its global network.

That system depends on something travellers rarely think about when everything works normally: predictable airspace.

The assumption has weakened in 2026.

The European Union Aviation Safety Agency, or EASA, currently maintains a conflict-zone information bulletin covering the airspace of the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. Its bulletin includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. The current revision was issued on 31 August and is valid through 30 September unless reviewed earlier.

EASA says the regional security situation remains volatile and identifies risks associated with military activity around the Gulf.

That does not mean Gulf airports are closed. Nor does it mean a passenger should assume his flight will be cancelled.

It means airlines are operating inside a more complicated risk environment than the familiar Karachi-Dubai-Frankfurt itinerary on a booking screen suggests.

Dubai and Abu Dhabi Are Still Operating

This distinction matters.

Reports of Middle East aviation disruption can easily create the impression that Dubai or Abu Dhabi has effectively stopped functioning. That is not what the evidence shows.

On 25 September, Gulf News reported that Dubai International and Abu Dhabi’s Zayed International Airport remained operational while airlines continued to adjust schedules. Some services were delayed or cancelled, and passengers were being advised to check their flight status before travelling to the airport.

The pattern is uneven.

One flight operates normally. Another leaves late. A third disappears from the schedule.

That unevenness creates a particular problem for connecting passengers.

A traveller whose Karachi-Dubai flight operates may still encounter trouble if the Dubai-Europe sector changes. A delay on the first sector can also destroy what looked like a comfortable connection when the ticket was purchased.

The airport can remain open while an individual journey falls apart.

A New UAE Decision Shows How Quickly Conditions Can Change

On 24 September, the UAE General Civil Aviation Authority announced that flights operated by Iranian airlines to and from the UAE had been suspended until further notice.

For most Pakistanis travelling through Dubai, this does not directly cancel an Emirates flight from Karachi.

Its importance lies elsewhere.

A regulatory decision can alter part of the regional aviation network almost immediately.

Airlines do not operate only according to passenger demand and published timetables. They must also respond to airspace restrictions, government decisions and security assessments.

A route printed on a ticket weeks earlier is therefore a plan, not a guarantee.

Why Airspace Matters Even When Your Destination Is Peaceful

I find this part easy to underestimate.

A Pakistani traveller may be flying from Karachi to Munich. Neither city is part of the Gulf conflict zone. He may reasonably wonder why developments elsewhere in the Middle East should concern him.

Look at the route rather than the destination.

An aircraft does not move between two airport codes in a straight line without constraints. Airlines must select safe and legally available airspace. When particular corridors become risky or unavailable, aircraft may have to take longer routes.

That can increase flying time.

It can also disturb aircraft rotations. A plane arriving late in Dubai may operate another service later that day. Crew-duty limits matter as well. Disruption can therefore travel through an airline’s network even when the passenger’s own destination is far from the original problem.

flydubai’s operational guidance illustrates the mechanism. The airline has warned that flight durations and Dubai transit times may become longer when flight paths have to be temporarily rerouted. It advises passengers to keep checking flight status and operational updates.

The British government’s current travel advice for Pakistan also warns that regional tensions can cause travel disruption and advises passengers to check with airlines before travelling.

The disruption does not need to reach Karachi physically to affect someone leaving Karachi.

The Connection Is Where the Financial Risk Appears

Now imagine two travellers.

Both are flying Karachi-Dubai-Munich.

One has bought the entire journey on a single through-ticket. The other has found a cheaper combination online: Karachi-Dubai on one booking and Dubai-Munich on another.

The itineraries may look almost identical on a screen.

Their risk is not necessarily identical.

When flights are booked under one protected itinerary, the operating airline normally has established procedures for dealing with a disrupted connection, subject to its conditions of carriage and the circumstances involved.

Separate tickets can create a harder problem.

If the first flight arrives late and the passenger misses the independently booked second flight, the second carrier may treat him as a no-show. Whether he receives assistance, rebooking or reimbursement will depend on the ticket conditions, applicable passenger-rights rules and any insurance he bought.

This is why I would be cautious about constructing a tight Gulf connection from separate tickets merely to save money.

The cheapest itinerary can become expensive very quickly.

Do Not Treat Every Cancellation as Evidence of War

There is another trap.

Not every delay at Dubai or Abu Dhabi is caused by geopolitical tension.

Airlines experience technical problems. Weather interferes with operations. Air-traffic-control failures occur. Aircraft arrive late from previous sectors.

A useful travel guide must preserve this distinction. Otherwise every delayed flight becomes evidence for a dramatic geopolitical narrative.

The relevant development in September 2026 is narrower.

Regional security conditions have added another source of uncertainty to an aviation system that already deals with ordinary operational disruption.

For the passenger, the cause matters because it may affect rebooking rights and insurance coverage.

Travel Insurance Deserves Another Look

Many Pakistanis still treat travel insurance as a visa document.

Buy the policy. Print the certificate. Put it in the Schengen file.

Finished.

That approach makes less sense when a journey passes through an aviation region exposed to sudden disruption.

A traveller should read what the policy actually covers.

Does it cover a missed connection? What happens after a lengthy delay? Does cancellation caused by armed conflict fall within coverage, or does the policy exclude war and related events?

There is no universal answer.

Policies differ.

What I Would Check Before Leaving Karachi

The old routine was simple. Confirm the ticket, reach Jinnah International Airport early and fly.

I would add another layer now.

First, I would check the individual flight number, not merely whether the airline is operating.

Emirates, Qatar Airways, Etihad and flydubai maintain flight-status or operational-update services. A headline saying an airline is “operating normally” cannot tell you whether your particular service has been delayed.

I would check again before leaving home.

For a connecting journey, I would then check the second sector separately. If the connection has become very tight, I would contact the airline before reaching the transit airport rather than discover the problem at the gate.

I would also make sure the airline has my current mobile number and email address.

There is another precaution I increasingly favour: keep essential medication, documents and a basic change of clothing in cabin baggage within the airline’s allowance.

A six-hour delay is irritating.

An unexpected overnight transit without your checked suitcase is something else.

Pakistani Travellers Should Also Watch the Transit Country

We naturally concentrate on the country printed beside “Destination.”

A Karachi passenger flying to Germany thinks about German immigration. Someone going to Britain checks UK visa rules.

The transit state deserves attention too.

A passenger travelling Karachi-Dubai-London has exposure to conditions in Pakistan, the UAE and Britain during the same journey.

Karachi-Doha-Paris creates another chain.

The ticket may be one document. Operationally, the journey crosses several regulatory and aviation environments.

Should Pakistanis Avoid Gulf Airlines?

The evidence does not support such a sweeping conclusion.

Dubai and Abu Dhabi remain major operating hubs. Gulf carriers continue carrying passengers through their networks despite reduced or adjusted schedules on some routes.

The more useful lesson is about resilience.

A traveller should favour a through-ticket when practical. Extremely tight connections deserve more scrutiny than before. Separate-ticket itineraries require particular caution.

And a passenger should stop treating a confirmed booking as the final word on whether a flight will operate exactly as scheduled.

In calmer times, I might have checked my ticket a day before departure and thought little more about it.

In September 2026, I would check again.

The Departure Board Does Not Tell the Whole Story

Back at Karachi airport, the board can still say On Time.

That remains good news.

But it tells me only that the first piece of my journey is working.

Somewhere beyond Karachi, an airline operations team may be examining airspace. Another government may issue a restriction. An incoming aircraft may already be late because it flew around an unavailable corridor.

None of this means Pakistani travellers should stop travelling.

It means the habits that worked in a predictable aviation system need adjustment.

Check the flight number. Check the connection. Understand what your ticket protects.

Then look at the departure board.

It is still useful.

It just no longer tells the whole story.