In November 1956, British soldiers were fighting in Egypt while another problem was developing in London.
Sterling was under pressure. Britain’s gold and dollar reserves were falling. Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Macmillan needed financial support at the very moment British and French forces were trying to impose their will around the Suez Canal.
Britain still looked like a great power. In many respects, it was one.
It had nuclear weapons and substantial armed forces. British bases remained scattered across the world. London was still one of the centres of international finance.
None of this prevented Suez from exposing an awkward fact. Britain’s ability to send forces overseas had survived longer than its ability to act without worrying about American financial support.
That is what interests me about Suez when I look at the United States in 2026.
I do not see a neat replay. America occupies a very different monetary position, and some popular comparisons between sterling then and the dollar now simply do not survive scrutiny.
Still, Suez leaves us with a question worth asking. Could America’s military reach eventually become larger than the financial room available to exercise it?
The crisis behind the military crisis
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal Company in July 1956. Britain and France regarded his action as a serious challenge to their interests.
Israel invaded Egypt in October. Britain and France then intervened after issuing an ultimatum that Egypt was unlikely to accept.
I had always thought of Suez mainly as a geopolitical humiliation. Looking closely at the financial record changes the picture.
Sterling operated under the Bretton Woods system at a fixed dollar exchange rate. Britain therefore needed reserves to defend the pound. Once confidence weakened and money started moving out, London faced a problem that military success in Egypt could not solve.
Macmillan sought access to financial resources through the International Monetary Fund. He later recalled receiving word during a British Cabinet meeting on November 6 that Washington would not support the necessary IMF procedure until Britain accepted a ceasefire.
There is an important wrinkle here. The editors of the US State Department’s historical documents say they found no record of that particular exchange in State Department files. IMF matters were handled by the US Treasury.
So we should be careful with the popular story that Eisenhower made one telephone call and Britain immediately surrendered.
The financial pressure itself is much better established. American records show severe losses in Britain’s gold and dollar reserves, and an IMF historical study describes how Britain’s need for outside financial assistance gave Washington considerable leverage.
Britain accepted the ceasefire. The episode measured British power in a way that battleships could not.
The empire had been weakening for years
Videos about Suez often compress decades of history into eleven dramatic days.
Britain’s problems went much further back. The First World War damaged its financial position. The Second World War placed another enormous burden on the country. India and Pakistan became independent in 1947, and the political structure of empire was already breaking apart across Asia and Africa.
Economic policy had created problems of its own. Britain returned sterling to the gold standard in 1925 at its old pre-war parity. The pound was overvalued, which forced painful adjustment onto the domestic economy. Britain abandoned gold six years later.
By the time Anthony Eden ordered military action over Suez, Britain was carrying commitments inherited from a richer and more dominant period.
Suez did something rather specific. It forced the British government to test how much independent power remained. The answer was uncomfortable.
I think that is a more useful historical lesson than saying the British Empire collapsed in eleven days.
America’s numbers deserve attention without theatrical arithmetic
The United States has its own fiscal problem.
The Congressional Budget Office projects a federal deficit of roughly $1.9 trillion in fiscal year 2026, equal to 5.8 percent of GDP. Debt held by the public is expected to reach about 101 percent of GDP this year. Under CBO’s baseline, it reaches 120 percent in 2036.
Interest costs have become harder to overlook. Net federal interest spending is expected to exceed $1 trillion in 2026.
Those figures concern me more than claims that BRICS is about to destroy the dollar. They also need context.
Britain in 1956 had to defend a fixed exchange rate. A sufficiently severe run on sterling could consume the reserves required to maintain it. Washington faces no comparable shortage of foreign currency when servicing federal debt.
Treasury debt is overwhelmingly denominated in dollars. The Federal Reserve operates the monetary system behind that currency. US government securities also sit inside one of the world’s deepest financial markets.
The mechanism that trapped Britain at Suez cannot simply be copied and pasted onto modern America.
But issuing dollars does not make the budget irrelevant
This objection deserves more attention than it usually gets. If the United States borrows in dollars and controls the supply of dollars, why should federal debt ever restrict American power?
It cannot run out of dollars in the same sense that Britain could run short of the foreign reserves needed to defend sterling. That advantage is enormous. It has limits.
Creating additional currency does not suddenly produce more steel, electricity or skilled labour. Push demand far enough beyond available productive capacity and inflation becomes part of the bill.
Interest creates another pressure. Treasury securities mature and have to be refinanced. When borrowing costs rise, a large stock of debt becomes increasingly expensive to carry.
CBO projects net interest costs rising from around 3.3 percent of GDP in 2026 to 4.6 percent by 2036. In dollar terms, annual net interest would rise to roughly $2.1 trillion.
No foreign government needs to threaten Washington for those payments to matter. Congress still has to fit them beside defence, healthcare and other federal commitments. It can borrow more. It can tax more. It can cut elsewhere. None of those choices is politically free.
For ordinary Americans, the fiscal argument also sits beside a broader affordability problem. I examined that gap between rising nominal incomes and household perceptions in American Wages Rose 28%. Why Do So Many People Still Feel Poorer?
Financial constraint in the American system would probably arrive through such arguments long before anyone announced a dollar crisis.
De-dollarisation is real, but the word hides several different things
I often see every non-dollar trade agreement presented as another brick removed from the foundations of American power. The evidence is less dramatic.
The Federal Reserve still describes the dollar as the leading currency in official reserves and the most widely used currency in foreign-exchange transactions, cross-border payments, international loans and international debt securities.
At the same time, some countries are trying to reduce their dependence on it. China and Russia conduct more trade outside the dollar than they once did. Western financial sanctions have given Russia, Iran and other targeted states obvious reasons to find alternative payment channels.
That sanctions pressure does not automatically produce economic isolation of the kind outsiders imagine. I explored a related case in If Iran Is Crippled by Sanctions, Why Do Pakistani Pilgrims Come Back Impressed?
A Chinese company paying a Russian supplier in yuan does not automatically mean either country’s central bank has found a substitute for the Treasury market. Trade settlement, payment infrastructure and reserve management are related, but they are not interchangeable.
A country can reduce dollar use in one corner of its economy while remaining deeply dependent on dollars elsewhere. That messy middle ground is probably where de-dollarisation will be decided.
Military reach has a price even when the currency is yours
America’s position also differs from Britain’s in another important way. The United States has wealthy allies.
NATO spreads part of the European security burden. Japan and South Korea support an extensive American strategic presence in Asia. Washington does not maintain its global position alone.
Even so, the United States carries military commitments across several regions while servicing a growing federal debt. SIPRI estimates US military expenditure at $954 billion in 2025, still by far the largest national total.
For the moment, it can do both. My concern lies farther ahead.
Britain ran into trouble when the international role its political class wanted to preserve became increasingly difficult to support with the country’s economic resources.
The United States does not need to follow the same path for the relationship between resources and commitments to matter. A government can remain rich while its choices become more expensive.
Imagine the test arriving in Asia
Suppose a serious confrontation develops in the Taiwan Strait sometime in the future.
The first discussions in Washington would concern military capability. Ships, aircraft, bases and allied support would dominate the early debate. Markets would not wait politely outside the room.
Investors would begin pricing risk. Any large military operation would add spending to a government already borrowing heavily. China would have strong incentives to test whatever payment channels and financial relationships it had built to soften the effect of American sanctions.
Then domestic politics would enter, probably noisily. Some members of Congress would support almost any cost required to defend American strategic interests. Others would ask why another huge commitment should be financed through borrowing. Allies might agree with Washington on the danger while disagreeing over sanctions or how much economic pain they were willing to absorb.
I cannot tell you how such a crisis would end. Nobody can.
But one outcome would deserve attention: Washington deciding that an action it possessed the military capacity to undertake carried financial or political costs it was unwilling to accept.
No dollar collapse would be necessary. That decision itself would tell us something about the boundaries of American power.
There may be no American Eisenhower
The Suez comparison becomes awkward at precisely this point. Britain faced the United States, a country with enough financial leverage to make British leaders reconsider their operation.
Who could perform that role against Washington?
China is the obvious candidate, but the relationship does not fit. Beijing holds substantial dollar assets and operates inside a trading system still heavily connected to dollar finance. A deliberate attempt to destabilise Treasury markets could damage Chinese interests as well.
BRICS does not provide a simple answer either. Its members have different economies and strategic interests. They have not created a common currency capable of taking over the dollar’s international role.
Perhaps America will never face one creditor with the leverage Washington possessed over Britain. The pressure could be more mundane.
Each year of large deficits adds obligations to future budgets. Higher interest payments gradually claim money that could otherwise support new priorities. Congress then argues over what should give.
Nothing dramatic happens on the day this process begins. It has already begun.
The harder question is when it starts affecting decisions that presidents once assumed America could make primarily on strategic grounds.
What Suez really exposed
Britain did not cease to matter after 1956.
It remained a nuclear power. London stayed an important financial centre. Britain retained its permanent seat on the UN Security Council and continued exercising considerable diplomatic influence.
Yet something had become visible during those November days. Britain had tried to behave according to one understanding of its power and discovered that the underlying financial reality had changed.
America in 2026 remains in a much stronger position. The dollar sits at the centre of international finance. US capital markets have extraordinary depth, and no rival currency offers an easy replacement.
That is why predictions of an imminent American Suez leave me unconvinced.
I am more interested in the crisis we cannot identify beforehand.
Budgets can deteriorate for years without producing a decisive moment. Military commitments accumulate. Rivals adjust. Payment systems change at the edges. Much of it looks manageable when examined separately.
Then some president has to make a difficult decision under pressure.
The ships may be available. Congress may be willing. The dollar may still be the world’s leading currency.
The surprise could come when Washington calculates the full price of using its power and decides that having the capability is no longer quite the same thing as having the freedom.