Editorial illustration of a security checkpoint and closed shops representing governance pressures in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Pakistan

From Gandapur to Afridi: Why Has PTI Struggled to Govern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa?

By Muhammad Munaeem Jamal | 12 October 2026

A year ago, Ali Amin Gandapur left the chief minister’s office in Peshawar after Imran Khan instructed him to resign. Sohail Afridi took his place. On 12 October 2026, Afridi was reported detained, a day after President Asif Ali Zardari imposed emergency rule in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The government changed hands once within PTI. Now Islamabad has intervened. Why has a province governed by PTI for much of the period since 2013 remained vulnerable to militant violence and economic disruption? Changing the chief minister alone cannot answer that question.

Why did Gandapur leave?

Gandapur became chief minister in March 2024. On 8 October 2025, he announced his resignation on Imran Khan’s instructions. PTI nominated Sohail Afridi, an assembly member from Khyber district. The change came amid worsening security and party disagreements. A procedural dispute delayed the transition; Afridi was elected on 13 October and took the oath on 15 October. The episode also exposed a tension within PTI: constitutional authority rested with the chief minister, while its imprisoned founder retained decisive influence over the party leadership. Gandapur’s replacement resolved the immediate succession, not the province’s security problems.

A security crisis cannot be measured by speeches

KP shares a sensitive border with Afghanistan. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and other armed groups have targeted people and institutions across the province. Islamabad accuses the TTP of finding sanctuary inside Afghanistan. According to the Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), KP recorded 638 violence-linked deaths in the third quarter of 2025. Later quarterly figures fluctuated rather than rising without interruption. They also include deaths associated with security operations, not just militant attacks. The figures establish a serious problem, but no single quarter proves whether Gandapur or Afridi governed effectively. Operations, changing militant tactics and conditions across the border complicate simple comparisons.

What could the chief ministers control?

Provincial authorities oversee policing and much of the criminal justice system. A chief minister can strengthen investigations, equip police units and improve administration in vulnerable districts. But the province does not independently determine Afghanistan policy, border controls or military strategy. Islamabad cannot shift its foreign-policy responsibilities to Peshawar; Peshawar cannot shift every weak investigation to Islamabad. The integration of the former tribal areas after their 2018 merger also demanded sustained investment in local institutions. Legal merger did not immediately produce reliable public services.

KP’s financial dependence

KP’s Budget Strategy Paper for 2026–27 projected Rs1,671 billion in federal transfers and Rs150 billion in provincial own receipts. Federal transfers therefore exceed projected own receipts more than elevenfold. These are forecasts, not proof of cash received. Provincial leaders depend heavily on decisions within Pakistan’s fiscal federation, particularly when relations with Islamabad deteriorate. Yet dependence does not absolve the province of responsibility for revenue collection or spending. The same budget strategy identified Rs164.52 billion allocated to policing in FY2025–26. An allocation does not establish how much was spent or what that spending achieved. Similarly, a reported fiscal surplus can coexist with weak roads, delayed schemes and struggling households.

The economic cost of an insecure border

Peshawar has long been a commercial centre connecting Pakistan and Afghanistan. When crossings close, transporters lose work and traders cannot move goods. The economic impact varies across the province. A shopkeeper serving local customers experiences different problems from an exporter whose livelihood depends on Torkham. Provincial officials can improve infrastructure and help affected businesses; they cannot unilaterally reopen an international border. The interaction between militant violence and federal border decisions makes KP’s economy particularly difficult to govern. I explored the military side of this relationship in an earlier article, Pakistan Is Striking Across the Afghan Border. How Far Can Islamabad Go Without Starting a Bigger War?.

Did PTI’s national struggle interfere with governing?

Imran Khan’s imprisonment placed national political mobilisation at the centre of PTI’s work. Gandapur participated in that campaign, and Afridi inherited the same tension between the party’s goals and the demands of his office. Peaceful protest is a democratic right. The question is whether provincial institutions continued their work effectively while leaders focused on national conflict. Meeting photographs and political speeches are weak evidence. Better measures include actual police spending, investigations completed, prosecutions pursued and development projects delivered. PTI’s extended period in KP makes scrutiny reasonable, while caretaker intervals and changing federal policies must also be acknowledged.

Governor’s rule changes responsibility

On 11 October 2026, President Zardari imposed emergency rule in KP. Federal representatives argued that security failures required intervention, and some made grave allegations concerning PTI officials and militant groups. PTI rejected those accusations. Public allegations are not judicial findings, and claims of evidence should be tested through independent scrutiny. Constitutional routes for emergency action and federal intervention have different conditions and oversight requirements. Those distinctions deserve legal examination, not slogans. Governor’s rule may change command and coordination; it does not itself end militancy or repair the local economy.

Who answers now?

Gandapur and Afridi served different lengths of time, and the latter inherited problems already present in October 2025. A fair assessment needs comparable data: militant attacks separated from deaths during operations; police budget allocations compared with actual spending; development expenditure compared with completed work; and federal transfer claims compared with receipts. The federal authorities exercising greater control now should face those same tests. A change of officials may redistribute power. People living in KP still need security and functioning public institutions. A different signature on an official order will not be enough.

Sources and further reading

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