Pakistan’s expanding security role in the Gulf has renewed its strategic importance. Yet the country remains dependent on external financing. The contrast between parliament’s Yemen decision in 2015 and today’s defence commitments raises a difficult question about who controls Pakistan’s foreign policy and who bears its economic costs.

On 10 April 2015, Pakistan’s parliament refused to join the Saudi-led military campaign in Yemen. Saudi Arabia had requested military assistance, including aircraft and troops. Pakistan’s lawmakers chose neutrality while promising to defend Saudi territory and the Islamic holy sites if they came under threat.

Eleven years later, the picture looks rather different.

In October 2026, Pakistan agreed to provide additional forces to Saudi Arabia under a defence arrangement involving Turkey. This time, no parliamentary vote preceded the commitment. The government said it had followed the necessary procedures, although the precise terms of the deployment remain undisclosed.

The contrast deserves attention. Reuters reported on 8 October that Pakistan’s latest Gulf commitment reflected the military’s growing influence over foreign policy under Field Marshal Asim Munir.

I keep returning to the 2015 parliamentary decision because it offers a useful way to examine Pakistan’s latest geopolitical opening. The country has acquired fresh strategic importance. But its economy remains vulnerable to foreign shocks, and its political institutions face serious questions about accountability. I examined the earlier parliamentary precedent in Pakistan’s Saudi Defence Commitments: Does Parliament Still Have a Say?

Pakistan has entered another period when other governments need its cooperation. The danger lies in confusing that demand with the foundations of lasting economic strength.

How Pakistan Became a Strategic Asset Before

Pakistan’s relationship with foreign powers has often followed a pattern shaped by events beyond its borders.

During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Washington treated Pakistan as a frontline ally. In 1981, the Reagan administration negotiated a five-year economic and military assistance package worth $3.2 billion. Pakistan became a vital channel for supporting Afghan resistance groups.

The arrangement brought financial resources and considerable diplomatic influence. It also tied Pakistan’s importance to an external conflict.

When Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan, the strategic relationship changed. In 1990, Washington suspended military assistance and new economic aid under the Pressler Amendment because of concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear programme.

The lesson was not that security partnerships had no value. Pakistan faced genuine threats, and external assistance helped meet real defence needs. The weakness lay in depending on a relationship whose terms could change according to another country’s priorities.

September 2001 produced another major shift.

Pakistan became central to American operations in Afghanistan. Washington resumed substantial financial support, while international creditors provided debt relief. Military reimbursements became another important source of funds.

According to the US Government Accountability Office, Pakistan received approximately $5.56 billion in Coalition Support Fund reimbursements for operations and logistical assistance between October 2001 and June 2007.

These payments were reimbursements for claimed military expenses, not ordinary development grants. The GAO raised concerns about the documentation and oversight of those claims.

Pakistan did undertake economic reforms during this period. Some policies improved financial stability, and international institutions acknowledged that progress. It would be wrong to dismiss every reform simply because the country later faced another crisis. For a closer comparison, see why growth under Ayub Khan and Musharraf did not last.

Yet the deeper economic problem survived. Temporary relief helped the government manage external payments. It did not create an economy capable of generating enough export earnings to avoid repeated financing pressures.

The Economic Cost of Depending on Strategic Importance

Pakistan’s recurrent financial difficulties have several causes. Weak tax collection is one. Expensive energy and poor productivity are others.

External partnerships have sometimes made these problems easier to manage without removing them.

A government that receives fresh deposits or debt relief gains valuable time. It can meet urgent foreign payments and reassure creditors. Political leaders may then face less immediate pressure to take difficult decisions.

The temptation is understandable. Tax reform creates opposition among influential groups. Energy-sector restructuring can raise household costs before efficiency improves. Export industries require reliable infrastructure and policies that survive changes of government.

Security cooperation, meanwhile, can produce faster diplomatic results. The problem begins when financial breathing space becomes an alternative to economic reform rather than an opportunity to complete it.

A World Bank assessment published in October 2025 described Pakistan’s declining export performance. Exports had fallen from around 16% of GDP in the 1990s to approximately 10% in 2024.

That comparison reveals a structural weakness. Pakistan has a large population and an established industrial base, yet its economy has struggled to expand export earnings in relation to its size. High trade barriers have limited competition, while costly electricity has weakened many producers.

Remittances provide vital support to households and foreign exchange reserves. They cannot, however, replace the development of competitive industries.

Without stronger exports, Pakistan remains exposed whenever global borrowing conditions tighten or import costs rise.

Pakistan’s Economy Has Improved, but the Vulnerability Remains

Any assessment of the current moment must acknowledge Pakistan’s economic recovery.

On 7 October 2026, the International Monetary Fund announced a staff-level agreement covering the fourth review of Pakistan’s Extended Fund Facility and the third review of its Resilience and Sustainability Facility.

The IMF estimated economic growth of 3.6% for fiscal year 2026. Gross foreign exchange reserves had reached approximately $21.5 billion by the end of September.

These figures represent real progress. The country is not in the same position it occupied during the severe external financing pressures of 2023.

The IMF also reported that programme implementation remained broadly on track. Subject to Executive Board approval, the October agreement would make approximately $1.21 billion available under the two arrangements.

But stabilisation is not the same as economic independence. The IMF continues to seek improvements in revenue administration and greater efficiency in the energy sector. It also wants Pakistan to strengthen governance in state-owned enterprises. The difference between macroeconomic recovery and household welfare is explored in Pakistan’s IMF Recovery: Why Economic Stability Has Yet to Reach Millions of Families.

The distinction matters because Pakistan is again discussing large external financing arrangements.

On 12 October, Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb told Reuters that Islamabad was continuing discussions with Washington over a proposed $10 billion exchange-stabilisation facility.

No agreement had been finalised. The minister also outlined plans to privatise additional state-owned entities, with the government hoping to raise more than $1 billion during the fiscal year.

These developments show that reform and external financing are taking place together.

There is no established evidence that the proposed American facility is payment for Pakistan’s military cooperation. Such a claim would require proof that is not publicly available.

The broader concern remains valid. Pakistan’s renewed diplomatic value is emerging while its economy continues to require support from foreign partners. That combination deserves close examination.

The Gulf Agreement Changes Pakistan’s Strategic Calculations

The defence relationship with Saudi Arabia has a long history. Pakistani military personnel have served in the kingdom under earlier bilateral arrangements.

The latest commitments, however, belong to a much more dangerous regional setting.

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defence agreement in September 2025. In August 2026, Turkey joined them in the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, establishing a collective defence framework.

The agreement has gained urgency amid renewed fighting in Yemen and attacks by the Iran-aligned Houthis on Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan’s involvement is not automatically a mistake.

Saudi Arabia is an important economic partner. It employs large numbers of Pakistani workers and has provided financial assistance during periods of difficulty. Maintaining the kingdom’s security also serves legitimate Pakistani interests.

The concern is the possibility of commitments expanding beyond their original purpose.

A defensive mission can begin with military advisers or technical assistance. Escalating conflict may create demands for a wider role, particularly when an ally faces repeated attacks.

Pakistan must consider these risks while managing its own security problems. Militancy remains a serious challenge, particularly along the Afghan frontier. The country has limited room for an additional prolonged military commitment.

It also has diplomatic interests beyond Riyadh.

Pakistan has played a mediation role involving Washington and Tehran during the 2026 Iran conflict. Direct military involvement against the Houthis could complicate relations with Iran and weaken Islamabad’s ability to present itself as a credible intermediary.

None of this means Pakistan should abandon its Gulf partners. It means the government should define the limits of its commitments before events begin defining them.

Why the 2015 Parliamentary Decision Still Matters

The April 2015 resolution was not a rejection of Saudi Arabia. Parliament expressly supported the kingdom’s territorial integrity while opposing participation in the Yemen conflict.

Lawmakers recognised that defending an ally’s territory was different from entering a civil war on its behalf. The distinction remains relevant.

In October 2026, the government said Pakistan’s new commitments had passed through the necessary official procedures. It did not publicly explain whether the cabinet had formally examined the deployment or disclose the operational details.

The constitution assigns authority over the armed forces to the federal government. A parliamentary vote is not automatically required for every military deployment.

The present criticism, therefore, should not rest on an unsupported allegation of illegality. It concerns political accountability.

The public has not been told how many additional personnel might be deployed, how long the mission could continue, or what financial obligations Pakistan might assume.

Those questions become more pressing when a defence commitment could widen during an active regional conflict.

Turkey offers an interesting comparison. On 12 October, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said his government would submit the Mecca agreement to parliament for ratification. Pakistan has not conducted a comparable public parliamentary process.

The important question is not whether every operational detail should become public. Some military information must remain confidential. It is whether elected representatives can examine the broad costs and policy limits of a commitment that may affect Pakistan’s security for years.

The Military’s Economic Role Needs Clear Boundaries

Pakistan’s civil-military relationship complicates the issue further.

The Special Investment Facilitation Council, established in 2023, provides a formal example of military participation in economic policy.

The council brings together civilian authorities and senior military representatives. Its stated purpose is to reduce bureaucratic delays and accelerate investment, especially in sectors where Pakistan seeks foreign capital.

Supporters argue that military involvement provides continuity. Investors dealing with complicated approvals may welcome an institution capable of coordinating government departments and resolving disputes.

There is practical force in that argument. But speed is not the only measure of economic governance.

Investors also need contracts that courts can enforce. Domestic businesses require fair competition, particularly when they operate outside projects favoured by powerful institutions.

The larger question is who remains responsible when an investment fails or a policy decision produces unexpected costs.

A council can help remove administrative obstacles. It cannot replace an accountable government, nor should military support become the main guarantee of economic policy.

The elected government must retain clear responsibility for investment decisions and their financial consequences.

That principle protects civilian authority. It also protects the military from being drawn permanently into matters for which it should not carry political responsibility.

What Pakistan Should Do Differently

Pakistan does not need to reject strategic partnerships to escape its old economic habits. It needs a clearer separation between the benefits of security cooperation and the obligations of economic reform.

The first requirement is parliamentary scrutiny of major overseas commitments. The government should provide legislators with a confidential assessment where necessary, while publicly explaining the mission’s broad purpose and expected costs.

Such oversight would not prevent military cooperation. It would give the country a formal mechanism for reconsidering a commitment if circumstances changed.

The second requirement is greater clarity over economic authority. SIFC may continue to facilitate investment, but elected officials should remain answerable for public spending and the terms offered to foreign investors.

The military can support economic stability without becoming the institution that determines economic priorities.

The third requirement concerns the use of any financial benefits arising from Pakistan’s diplomatic relationships.

New deposits and credit facilities may help stabilise foreign payments. The government should use that breathing space to improve export competitiveness rather than allowing it to delay difficult reforms.

Electricity-sector losses deserve particular attention. So do the trade barriers that make Pakistani producers less competitive.

Success should be measured through export earnings and stronger domestic investment, not the size of foreign pledges announced after high-level meetings.

A signed memorandum is not a functioning factory. A promised investment does not create lasting employment until the project actually proceeds.

The Question Pakistan Cannot Keep Postponing

Pakistan’s latest diplomatic opening has arrived during a period of economic recovery, not economic strength.

Foreign exchange reserves have improved, and the IMF has recognised progress. Yet the country remains sensitive to rising energy prices and disruptions in the Gulf, where so much of its external economic relationship is concentrated.

Security cooperation may bring additional opportunities. It could also create obligations that become expensive when regional conditions deteriorate.

Pakistan has experienced both sides of geopolitical importance before.

The question now is whether the country can use its new relevance to strengthen the economic institutions that have remained weak through earlier partnerships.

There is also a more immediate issue.

In April 2015, Pakistan’s elected representatives debated the proposed military role in Yemen and reached a public decision. In October 2026, the country has accepted new Gulf defence commitments while important details remain outside public scrutiny.

How much will those commitments cost? Who will authorise any expansion? And will the civilian government retain the authority to reconsider them if the conflict widens?

Pakistan’s strategic partners have their own interests to protect. Islamabad must decide how it will protect its own.