An open historical book on a wooden table under warm light, surrounded by archival documents.

When Historical Memory Becomes a Weapon Against Another Community

An essay calling for Black-Jewish solidarity ends by invoking Arab slave traders. The contradiction raises a question about selective history and inherited guilt.

I was reading Brian Meadows’s Medium essay, Jews and Blacks: Differences, when I reached a paragraph that made me return to the beginning.

Meadows wanted Black and Jewish Americans to rebuild their old political alliance. He believed their different experiences of persecution deserved recognition. His concern about antisemitism was understandable, particularly after the hostility Jewish communities faced following the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023, and the subsequent war in Gaza.

Then he brought Muslim Arabs into the discussion.

Meadows referred to centuries of Arab involvement in slavery, described Muslim Arabs as the worst offenders, and advised Black readers to remember who their real friends were.

I read that last passage twice. The essay had begun by asking two communities to respect one another’s painful histories. Why had it ended by inviting suspicion of a third?

I do not question whether Arab slave trading occurred. It did. What interested me was how a historical crime had become an argument about whom Black Americans should trust today.

The Slavery That Meadows Wants Remembered

Arab merchants participated in slave trading across the Sahara and through Indian Ocean networks. Muslim rulers and commercial interests were involved at different periods. Some enslaved people worked in households or agriculture. Others faced military service or exploitation in different forms.

The record deserves attention, including the suffering of Africans transported through these networks.

I find it troubling when Muslims discuss European colonialism in great detail but become uncomfortable when slavery under Muslim rulers enters the conversation.

Our ancestors’ religion cannot determine which historical crimes we are willing to investigate.

But Meadows goes further than acknowledging a documented history.

He calls Muslim Arabs the longest and bloodiest slave traders and suggests that they were the first middlemen in the transatlantic trade.

Those are comparative claims requiring evidence. His essay supplies none.

The Atlantic slave trade followed a different commercial structure. European and Brazilian merchants operated ships carrying enslaved Africans to plantation economies in the Americas. African rulers and merchants also participated in capture and sale.

According to the SlaveVoyages database, an estimated 12.5 million captive Africans were embarked on transatlantic voyages between 1501 and 1866. Roughly 10.7 million survived the Atlantic crossing.

Portuguese and Brazilian carriers transported the largest estimated share, followed by British carriers.

These figures concern the Atlantic system. They cannot establish which slave-trading network was the bloodiest across all regions and centuries. Nor do they support Meadows’s claim about the earliest middlemen.

The distinction matters because historical comparisons can become unreliable when writers choose the measure that best serves their argument.

I would rather examine what each system did to human beings than try to award a grim historical title to one civilization.

When the Perpetrator Disappears Behind a Religious Label

There is a change in language that I have noticed in political arguments.

A discussion begins with identifiable people. An official ordered something. A merchant profited from a transaction. A government adopted a policy.

Then the names disappear.

The discussion shifts toward Jews, Muslims, Europeans or Africans. Eventually, a religious or ethnic identity appears to explain the conduct of people who lived centuries apart.

Meadows’s final paragraph makes this shift.

He moves from historical Arab slave traders to advice about the friends Black Americans should choose.

But who exactly is being judged?

A Muslim family in Karachi did not finance an eighteenth-century slave caravan. An Egyptian shopkeeper today did not command a nineteenth-century slave market.

Some modern institutions may have benefited from historical exploitation. Their records and responsibilities deserve investigation. That is different from treating ordinary people as morally suspect because they belong to a particular religious community.

The historical evidence may be accurate while the accusation drawn from it remains unfair.

Historians Have Encountered This Problem Before

In 1995, the American Historical Association took the unusual step of addressing claims about Jewish involvement in the Atlantic slave trade.

The association rejected allegations that Jews had played a disproportionate role in the trade or in the exploitation of enslaved labour. Historians David Brion Davis and Seymour Drescher had challenged claims that inflated Jewish responsibility.

The AHA’s published resolution also condemned the use of distorted historical evidence to demean religious or ethnic communities.

That intervention is worth remembering when reading Meadows.

The allegations are not identical. The history of Arab participation in slavery is real, while claims of disproportionate Jewish control over the Atlantic trade were rejected by historians.

Still, the political method deserves comparison.

Take a long and complicated history. Select the actors who share one identity. Then encourage readers to associate that identity with the wrongdoing.

A person need not invent every fact to produce a misleading account.

The omissions can do much of the work.

The Karachi Connection

The problem feels less distant when I think about Karachi.

I have written about the Jewish community that once lived in this city.

Before Partition, Jewish residents maintained a synagogue and participated in Karachi’s civic life. Many belonged to the Bene Israel community, whose history in the subcontinent began long before Israel became a state.

The establishment of Israel in 1948 changed the political atmosphere. Later Arab-Israeli wars added to the insecurity. Some Jewish families left because they feared hostility, while others migrated for family or personal reasons.

The surviving accounts do not explain every departure.

But the distinction between local Jewish residents and the Israeli government should never have been difficult to understand.

A Jewish shopkeeper in Karachi was not responsible for decisions taken by political leaders in Israel.

Anger over the treatment of Palestinians could not establish his personal guilt.

That is also why I have argued elsewhere that blaming Jews for Israel’s actions is a failure of political accountability.

I can criticize Israeli government policy without asking Jewish families to answer for it. I should be equally careful when discussing slavery in Muslim history.

Otherwise, I would be asking other people to observe a standard that I abandon whenever my own community becomes the subject of criticism.

Historical Responsibility Is Not the Same as Personal Guilt

There is another difficulty here.

Rejecting inherited guilt should not become an excuse for ignoring the continuing effects of slavery.

Enslaved people built wealth that others inherited. Colonial institutions often survived the people who created them. Land ownership and social disadvantage could continue long after formal abolition.

These consequences deserve research and, where justified, institutional remedies.

The argument is not that the past has no claim on the present.

It is that we need to identify the claim correctly.

A government might owe redress because it inherited obligations from an earlier state. A company might possess records showing that its predecessors profited from enslavement. Descendant communities may have claims connected to those institutions.

None of this requires an assumption that a person is guilty merely because of ancestry.

Political responsibility can outlast individual perpetrators without becoming collective personal guilt.

That distinction is harder to maintain than a slogan about historical enemies. It also leads to more useful questions.

Who benefited? Which institution survived? What evidence connects a present injustice to an earlier policy?

Meadows does not pursue those questions. His final paragraph asks readers to identify friends and enemies.

What Kind of Alliance Would This Produce?

The Black-Jewish alliance in the United States had a substantial role in the civil rights movement. Jewish activists joined Black civil rights organizations, although the relationship also experienced tension and disagreement.

Meadows wants renewed cooperation. I understand why.

But his proposed solidarity seems to make one historical memory central while using another to cast suspicion on outsiders.

There is an obvious complication.

Many Black Americans are Muslims. Muslim communities also include people with African ancestry and family histories tied to slavery.

Where would they belong in an alliance that treats Muslim identity as a reason for distrust?

The question is not rhetorical for its own sake. It exposes the difficulty of arranging communities into permanent categories of victims, allies and enemies.

Real people have overlapping identities. Their political views differ even within the same family. A history of persecution does not guarantee agreement over present policy.

An alliance built around working families would have to accept those complications.

It would also need room for disagreement about Israel and Palestine. Concern about antisemitism deserves serious attention. So do Palestinian rights and the conduct of the Israeli government.

Neither issue can be settled by assigning collective motives to Jews or Muslims.

What We Choose to Remember

I returned to Meadows’s essay after checking the historical claims.

His opening still struck me as reasonable. Communities carrying painful memories should not have to pretend that their experiences were identical.

But his ending exposed a weakness in the argument.

He wanted readers to recognize the dangers of hostility toward Jews while appearing willing to direct historical suspicion toward Muslims.

I do not know whether he intended that contradiction. I can only judge the words he published.

The past offers more than enough evidence of human cruelty. We do not need to conceal Arab involvement in slavery, minimize European responsibility for the Atlantic trade or exaggerate Jewish participation to understand what happened.

We need to examine the institutions and the people who actually exercised power.

I keep returning to one question.

When someone brings an atrocity from centuries ago into a present political argument, are they trying to establish responsibility, or are they trying to decide whom we should distrust?

The historical evidence may be the same.

Its political use is not.

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