Can Pakistan Fix Its Economy Without Fixing Its Political Institutions?

At Harvard, Atif Mian praised the finance minister’s crisis response but questioned the decisions that left Pakistan exposed. Daron Acemoglu traced the problem to decades of institutional failure.

Atif Mian did something unexpected during a discussion about Pakistan’s economy at Harvard. He agreed with the finance minister. Muhammad Aurangzeb had explained how his government was managing the energy emergency caused by the Middle East conflict. Pakistan had limited fuel stocks, shipping routes were disrupted, and officials were arranging supplies while trying to protect consumers from rising prices.

Mian told the audience he could hardly imagine a better response under the circumstances. Then he asked a harder question: why was Pakistan so vulnerable in the first place? Daron Acemoglu, the Nobel laureate from MIT, argued that Pakistan had lived with a political economy crisis for at least 30 years. Former State Bank governor Reza Baqir moderated the April 2026 discussion.

Aurangzeb Had an Emergency to Manage

Pakistan entered the conflict without substantial strategic petroleum reserves. According to Aurangzeb, commercial stocks of different fuels covered roughly 20 to 28 days. Rerouting supplies through Yanbu could extend journeys from five or six days to 15 to 20 days. The government coordinated procurement across ministries, initially used broad fuel subsidies and subsequently moved towards targeted support. Its immediate priority was keeping fuel available. Mian acknowledged that emergency management had to be judged against these constraints. But who created the vulnerability?

Atif Mian’s Broken Nervous System

“The nervous system is broken,” Mian said. He meant Pakistan’s inability to anticipate risks and organise investment around a long-term strategy. Governments respond after shocks arrive. They arrange emergency fuel shipments, restrict imports during foreign exchange shortages and seek external financing when reserves run low. Such measures may be necessary, but they cannot replace planning.

Mian illustrated his argument with solar electricity and electric motorcycles. Using an illustrative generation cost of five US cents per kilowatt-hour, he calculated that energy for electric two-wheeler travel could cost about Rs30 for a distance comparable to that covered by a litre of petrol. This is an energy-cost illustration, not a full ownership-cost comparison. Battery replacement, charging losses, financing and infrastructure would affect actual savings. Still, his question stands: why had Pakistan not done more to reduce transport’s reliance on imported fuel?

The CPEC Decisions Mian Questioned

Mian linked today’s energy vulnerability to coal-fired generation investments under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. He recalled warning against contracts carrying guaranteed dollar-linked returns. Pakistan did need generating capacity when power shortages disrupted industry. But capacity-payment obligations and currency-linked contractual terms can impose lasting costs. Not every CPEC plant has identical terms, and a proper judgment requires project-level evidence. The larger issue is whether policy makers sufficiently considered technological change and long-term affordability.

Acemoglu Was Looking at a Longer Crisis

Acemoglu explicitly said he was not a Pakistan specialist. He nevertheless found the country’s long-term economic record alarming. He cited low tax revenue, weak education and Pakistan’s relative performance against Bangladesh and India. His figures, including approximately 9% tax revenue and 40% illiteracy, were claims made during the panel, not independently established October 2026 measurements.

His institutional argument was sharper than those individual figures. Taxation, education and competition reflect political choices. Influential groups can resist taxes and preserve protection. Governments may postpone difficult reforms because the political costs are immediate while benefits take years. Acemoglu said the elite had to recognise its responsibility and that reforms would ultimately need trust in institutions and democratic support.

Pakistan’s Latest Numbers Tell Two Stories

The World Bank’s October 2026 Pakistan Development Update estimated FY2026 real GDP growth at 3.7%, up from 3.2% the previous year. The IMF reported gross official reserves of about $21.5 billion at the end of September. Both reports appeared months after the Harvard discussion and should not be confused with the numbers available to the panellists in April.

These improvements matter. In my years working with cross-border payments, I saw how foreign exchange pressure complicates imports and settlement arrangements. A more stable external position gives businesses greater room to plan. Yet the World Bank also estimated real GDP per capita growth at only about 1.6% and average annual labour productivity growth of roughly 0.4% between 2014 and 2024. Pakistan still struggles to increase output per worker.

Why Reform Is Harder Than Announcing It

A finance minister can promise to widen the tax base. Enforcement raises harder questions: which sectors face scrutiny, which exemptions survive and whether influential taxpayers face the same rules. Agricultural income taxation depends on provincial legislation and administration. Federal promises alone cannot deliver it. In electricity, higher tariffs may improve immediate revenue without reducing theft, technical losses or poor collection. Paying consumers then shoulder costs the system has failed to control.

Democracy and the Economic Question

Elections do not guarantee competent economic management. But independent courts, legislative scrutiny and political competition can constrain arbitrary decisions and expose preferential treatment. Acemoglu’s research explores how democratic institutions can support development; in the supplied Harvard transcript, he specifically called for democratic buy-in to institutional reform. Reform that imposes sacrifices without public trust may face resistance even when its technical goals are sensible.

The Next Test Is Not Another IMF Review

The World Bank’s conditional reform scenario suggests annual growth of about 6.2% to 6.9%, not a guaranteed forecast. Pakistan should measure progress through lower electricity losses, broader tax compliance, more competitive exports and sustained productivity growth. Reserves matter, but they do not show whether a worker’s real purchasing power has improved. Mian accepted the minister’s emergency response and challenged the decisions that made the emergency dangerous. Acemoglu supplied the institutional explanation. The next time Pakistan reports higher reserves, I would also like to see what has changed in the institutions that keep producing these crises.

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