In August 1990, American troops began arriving in Saudi Arabia. Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait, and Riyadh feared Iraqi forces might advance south. King Fahd agreed to receive American troops under Operation Desert Shield.
Saudi Arabia helped finance the deployment. The US Department of Defense later recorded approximately $16.85 billion in Saudi contributions to American costs for Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
Thirty-six years later, Saudi Arabia spends an estimated $83.2 billion a year on defence, according to SIPRI’s 2025 figures. Yet it continues to seek military support from other countries. The question is not whether alliances are legitimate. It is what Riyadh can defend independently after decades of heavy spending.
America Came When Saddam Threatened Saudi Arabia
Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Washington intervened partly to prevent Iraq from dominating the Gulf and threatening regional oil supplies. The US-led coalition served American strategic interests as well as Saudi security.
Calling the American forces hired soldiers would misrepresent that operation. Saudi Arabia contributed roughly $12.81 billion in cash and $4.05 billion in supplies and services toward American costs. Those contributions helped sustain a multinational campaign, not a private contract with individual soldiers.
The coalition expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991. For Riyadh, the experience showed how financial resources and strong international relationships could provide protection when a threat exceeded its own military capacity.
What Has Saudi Arabia Bought With Its Defence Budget?
SIPRI estimated Saudi military spending at $83.2 billion in 2025, or around 6.5% of GDP. The kingdom ranked eighth worldwide. It also ranked third among importers of major arms during 2021-2025, with the United States supplying 77% of those imports.
Saudi imports of major arms fell by 31% compared with 2016-2020. SIPRI measures delivered weapons rather than every contract signed. A decline in deliveries does not by itself demonstrate a decline in military readiness.
Saudi Arabia operates modern aircraft and sophisticated air-defence systems. But purchases do not tell us how effectively its forces can maintain equipment, coordinate units or sustain a long campaign. Public spending totals cannot settle those operational questions.
Yemen Exposed the Limits of Conventional Military Power
Saudi Arabia led a coalition into Yemen’s civil war in March 2015. The coalition possessed advanced aircraft, but the Houthis controlled territory and knew the difficult mountain routes. The intervention did not produce a quick victory.
Iran has supported the Houthis, but the movement has its own leadership and political objectives. Its conflict is rooted in Yemen’s domestic history. Treating it merely as an Iranian unit obscures why outside military pressure has struggled to defeat it.
The Houthis survived years of airstrikes and developed missile and drone capabilities that threatened Saudi territory. Foreign military assistance may strengthen Saudi defences, but it cannot by itself deliver a political settlement in Yemen.
Pakistan and Türkiye Enter the Defence Picture
On 7 August 2026, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement. It sets out a collective-defence commitment. On 5 October, the three governments announced arrangements for agreed military forces and capabilities to deploy rapidly in Saudi Arabia, subject to national procedures.
Türkiye’s parliament approved ratification legislation on 5 November, and the law was published on 14 November. Article 16 requires the final instrument of ratification to be deposited before the agreement enters into force. The public information reviewed does not independently establish that this final step has occurred.
These developments are substantial, but they do not prove that Pakistani or Turkish soldiers have been contracted to fight offensively inside Yemen. Collective defence, military training and combat operations are distinct commitments.
Pakistan faced a similar choice in 2015, when its parliament backed neutrality in Yemen while affirming support for Saudi territorial integrity. That distinction still matters. I explored the dilemma in my earlier article on Pakistan, Iran and Saudi defence commitments.
Türkiye brings defence-industrial capabilities and experience with overseas operations. Pakistan has a longstanding training relationship with Riyadh. Each government has its own reasons to cooperate, and each must weigh the consequences of a deployment.
The Disputed Syrian Deployment
On 4 November 2026, Syria and Saudi Arabia signed agreements that included defence cooperation. Reuters reported Syrian advisers and trainers in Saudi Arabia. Associated Press reported preparations for a possible deployment of approximately 600 Syrian special forces personnel.
Other reports alleged larger deployments and involvement inside Yemen. Damascus denied sending combat troops there. The claims are not interchangeable: an advisory mission in Saudi Arabia does not establish a Syrian combat deployment into Yemen.
Syria is still rebuilding its armed forces after years of civil war. Its military cooperation with Riyadh may bring training and diplomatic advantages. A decision to send troops into Yemen would carry different risks. I examined those conflicting accounts in my separate analysis of Syria’s Saudi military relationship.
Do Foreign Partners Prove Saudi Arabia Is Weak?
Not necessarily. Powerful countries maintain alliances because threats cross borders and military capabilities are costly. A defence agreement can deter an attack even when the country being protected has substantial forces of its own.
The more useful test is whether outside assistance develops Saudi capabilities or becomes a substitute for them. Foreign instructors can transfer skills. Foreign governments, however, retain their own interests and may refuse operations that do not serve those interests.
Saudi Arabia’s reliance on partners therefore raises a question about military institutions, not the courage of Saudi soldiers. Which essential tasks can Riyadh sustain without outside personnel, intelligence or logistical support? The publicly available budget does not answer that.
The Price of Protection
In 1990, the kingdom relied on a US-led coalition because it feared Saddam Hussein’s army. In 2026, it is developing closer defence arrangements with Pakistan and Türkiye while exploring cooperation with Syria. The threats and partners have changed.
Alliances may strengthen Saudi security. They cannot guarantee that foreign governments will support every Saudi military decision, nor can they resolve Yemen’s political divisions. Saudi Arabia can afford sophisticated weapons and influential partners. What money cannot guarantee is that another country will always be willing to fight the war Riyadh wants fought.
Sources
US Government Accountability Office, Gulf War contributions; SIPRI, military expenditure 2025; SIPRI, arms transfers 2025; Pakistan Foreign Ministry, October 2026 joint statement.