Working in banking in Karachi gave me an unusual window into Pakistan’s relationship with Iran.

Over the years, I met Shia colleagues and customers who travelled regularly to Iran and Iraq for pilgrimage. They returned with stories about Mashhad, Qom and other Iranian cities. Many spoke warmly about Iran. Some admired its resistance to Israel and the United States. Others talked mainly about religious institutions, transport, markets and the treatment of pilgrims.

The pattern stayed in my mind.

In recent conversations, I began asking a harder question: if Pakistan has tens of millions of Shias, and many feel a religious or political connection with Iran, how much practical influence does this give Tehran inside Pakistan?

The question becomes even more important when Iran is under enormous military and economic pressure. It is also surprisingly easy to answer badly.

Counting Shias is difficult. Measuring sympathy is harder. Turning sympathy into claims about control of banks, companies or state institutions is harder still. Once I began checking the numbers, the distinction became crucial.

Pakistan Does Not Actually Count Sunnis and Shias Separately

Pakistan’s 2023 digital census counted 240.46 million people. Of them, 231.69 million, or 96.35 percent, were recorded as Muslim.

But there is a detail that changes the entire discussion. The census did not distinguish between Sunni and Shia Muslims. The official Pakistan Bureau of Statistics figures therefore cannot tell us how many Shias live in the country. Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, National Census Report 2023.

Any precise claim such as “Pakistan has exactly 40 million Shias” should therefore make us cautious.

The estimate most often used by international researchers puts Shias at roughly 15 to 20 percent of Pakistan’s Muslim population. The U.S. State Department uses that range and includes communities such as Twelver Shias, Ismailis, Bohras and ethnic Hazara Shias. U.S. State Department, 2023 International Religious Freedom Report: Pakistan.

Apply that estimate to the 231.69 million Muslims recorded in the census and we get approximately 34.8 million to 46.3 million Shias.

That is not a census count. It is an estimate derived from a commonly cited range. Still, even the lower figure is enormous.

Pakistan consequently has one of the largest Shia populations anywhere outside Iran. Reuters, reporting on unrest in Pakistan in March 2026, described Pakistan’s Shia community as the world’s second largest after Iran’s and used an estimate of roughly one-fifth of Pakistan’s population. Reuters, March 5, 2026.

Population, however, tells us only how many people may belong to a religious community. It tells us almost nothing about how those people think.

Sympathy for Iran Is Real, but “Pakistani Shias Support Iran” Is Too Simple

My personal encounters have often produced a strong impression of sympathy toward Iran among Pakistani Shias. Recent events show that this impression is not imaginary.

After Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in U.S.-Israeli strikes in 2026, large demonstrations erupted in Pakistan. Reuters documented protests in Karachi, Islamabad, Lahore, Skardu and other places. The clashes became deadly. Reuters, March 1, 2026.

Reuters later examined the response specifically within Pakistan’s Shia community. Shia clerics declared mourning. Demonstrators described Khamenei in intensely religious terms. One organiser told Reuters that the Iranian leader had been regarded almost like a religious representative of their community. Reuters, March 5, 2026.

Something important is happening here.

For many Pakistani Twelver Shias, Iran is not merely another foreign country. Its religious seminaries, clerical institutions and history since the 1979 revolution give it a significance that Saudi Arabia, China or the United States cannot replicate.

But even this evidence does not justify saying that every Pakistani Shia supports the Iranian government.

Shias in Pakistan are not politically uniform. A businessman in Karachi, a Hazara family in Quetta, an Ismaili professional in Hunza and a Twelver cleric trained in Qom may all appear under the broad statistical description “Shia.” Their theology, political interests and relationship with Iran can differ substantially.

Support also means different things. Someone may oppose an Israeli attack on Iran without supporting Iran’s political system. A pilgrim may respect Iranian religious scholarship but dislike Tehran’s regional policies. Someone else may admire Iran’s confrontation with Washington while having no interest in Iranian domestic politics.

Those differences disappear when we use a sentence such as “the Shias support Iran.” Reality is messier.

Older Polling Shows Why the Impression Exists

There is historical evidence of unusually favourable Pakistani attitudes toward Iran.

A Pew Research Center survey published in 2012 found that 76 percent of Pakistanis surveyed viewed Iran favourably. Pakistan stood out from several other Muslim-majority countries included in the research. Pew Research Center, 2012.

Another survey from roughly the same period found sharp Sunni-Shia differences in Pakistani attitudes toward Iranian power. Among Pakistani Shia respondents, 45 percent said the Middle East would be more secure if Iran were a nuclear power, compared with only 4 percent of Sunni respondents in that survey. Wilson Center survey report.

Those numbers are fascinating. They are also old.

Much has happened since 2012: Syria’s war, Iran’s economic crisis, changes in Pakistan, regional competition, conflicts involving Israel and Iran, and the upheavals of 2026.

It would therefore be irresponsible to present a 2012 survey as proof of Pakistani Shia attitudes in October 2026. The older surveys establish something narrower. Pro-Iran feeling in Pakistan has deep roots, and sectarian identity has sometimes influenced attitudes toward Tehran.

Recent demonstrations show that the relationship has not disappeared. What we lack is a fresh, nationally representative survey asking Pakistani Sunnis and Shias the same detailed questions today.

Do Shias Control Pakistan’s Banking Sector?

Here the evidence becomes much weaker.

I understand why the question arises. Anyone who has worked inside banking encounters executives, business families and professional networks from many religious backgrounds. From personal observation, patterns can begin to look significant.

But observation is not a database.

The State Bank of Pakistan publishes extensive statistics covering scheduled banks, microfinance institutions and development finance institutions. It classifies institutions by financial and regulatory categories. It publishes assets, liabilities, deposits, advances and other banking information. State Bank of Pakistan banking statistics.

It does not publish a table showing what percentage of Pakistan’s banking assets are controlled by Sunnis, Shias, Ismailis or Bohras.

SBP also requires banks and financial institutions to report shareholding information, including significant ownership and the shareholdings of senior management. Those disclosure requirements concern legal ownership and corporate governance, not sectarian identity. State Bank of Pakistan, BPRD Circular Letter No. 30 of 2022.

So I found no credible basis for statements such as “Shias control 30 percent of Pakistani banking.” Or 40 percent. Or 50 percent. The number simply does not exist in reliable official data.

Trying to manufacture one by examining surnames would be even worse. Names cannot safely serve as substitutes for verified religious identity. Nor does the religion of a chairman, shareholder or chief executive automatically determine what a regulated bank does.

The same warning applies to textiles, pharmaceuticals, media, real estate and other sectors. There are wealthy and influential Pakistani Shia families. There are also wealthy Sunni families and members of smaller religious communities in business. That is different from proving collective sectarian control.

A Shia Banker Cannot Simply Turn a Pakistani Bank Into an Iranian Financial Channel

The banking question becomes especially interesting when we ask whether personal sympathy for Iran could translate into financial assistance.

Here my own professional experience with cross-border banking makes me particularly cautious. Modern banks do not operate according to the personal foreign-policy preferences of individual employees.

Transactions pass through compliance systems. Banks screen customers and counterparties. They examine beneficial ownership and sanctions exposure. Pakistan’s State Bank has instructed regulated institutions to screen customers and associated parties against sanctions and watch lists and to deny services to proscribed entities and persons. State Bank of Pakistan, BPRD Circular Letter No. 4 of 2017.

Iran presents an additional problem.

Pakistan’s own Ministry of Commerce has acknowledged the absence of normal banking channels between Pakistan and Iran. That limitation helped push the government toward barter arrangements for bilateral trade. Pakistan Ministry of Commerce, Year Book 2023–24.

Pakistan and Iran do have a formal preferential trade agreement, and both governments have repeatedly tried to expand commerce. Yet sanctions and payment difficulties have prevented their economic relationship from functioning like Pakistan’s trade with countries connected normally to the international banking system. Pakistan-Iran Preferential Trade Agreement.

Reuters reported in August 2026 that Pakistan and Iran wanted to expand bilateral trade significantly, while sanctions had helped push a substantial part of cross-border commerce into informal channels. Reuters, August 20, 2026.

Religion does not remove those constraints. A bank officer sympathetic to Iran cannot override correspondent-bank requirements, sanctions screening or institutional compliance simply because he likes Iranian foreign policy.

Where Iran’s Real Influence in Pakistan Matters More

The more interesting field is not ownership of banks. It is networks.

Iran has spent decades building religious, educational and political connections with parts of Pakistan’s Shia population. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 strengthened those connections at precisely the time when General Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamisation policies were transforming sectarian politics inside Pakistan.

Reuters, examining the 2026 unrest, quoted scholars who traced modern Pakistani Shia political mobilisation partly to that period. Iran became a source of religious authority and support for communities that increasingly felt threatened by sectarian violence inside Pakistan. Reuters, March 5, 2026.

Such links can produce real influence. Religious seminaries matter. Clerics matter. Pilgrimage networks create relationships across borders. Political organisations can mobilise supporters.

There has also been a much darker security dimension. Iran recruited Pakistani Shias into the Zainabiyoun formation that fought in Syria. That history demonstrates that Tehran has been able, in particular circumstances, to transform ideological or religious connections with a small number of Pakistanis into organised activity.

But scale matters. A recruitment network involving hundreds or thousands cannot simply be projected onto a population of perhaps 35 to 46 million people. That mistake would be enormous.

Recent Sanctions Show What Material Assistance Actually Looks Like

An event in September 2026 helps draw the distinction.

The United States imposed sanctions on individuals and entities in several countries, including Pakistan, which Washington alleged were involved in procuring components for Iranian weapons programmes. Reuters, September 29, 2026.

Whatever one thinks of American sanctions policy, the episode illustrates how states actually investigate assistance to Iran. They look for companies. They trace transactions. They identify procurement intermediaries and supply chains.

They do not begin by counting the Shia population of a country.

That is the analytical mistake I wanted to avoid when I began examining this subject.

Iran does not need 40 million Pakistani sympathisers to obtain meaningful assistance. A small number of people with the right commercial contacts, logistics access or specialised technology could matter considerably more.

Conversely, 40 million people could sympathise emotionally with Iran while contributing almost nothing to its military or financial capacity.

Pakistan Itself Cannot Afford a Sectarian Foreign Policy

There is another complication.

Pakistan has relations with Iran, but it also has extraordinarily important ties with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. It needs the United States and maintains a deep strategic relationship with China.

The Iranian conflict therefore puts Islamabad in an uncomfortable position.

After the violence surrounding Iran in 2026, Pakistan publicly expressed concern about attacks on Iran while also emphasising solidarity with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. Reuters described this as a difficult balancing act between domestic Shia anger and Pakistan’s external relationships. Reuters, March 5, 2026.

That balancing act tells us something important about power.

If tens of millions of Pakistani Shias automatically translated into Iranian control over Pakistani policy, Islamabad would not be balancing Iran against Saudi Arabia, Washington and other partners. It would already have chosen a side.

It has not.

Forty Million Shias Do Not Equal Forty Million Iranian Allies

I started with something I had observed personally.

Shia Pakistanis I encountered often spoke about Iran with a warmth that I rarely heard when people discussed other foreign governments. The intensity became difficult to ignore.

Research tells me not to dismiss that observation. Iran clearly possesses religious and political influence among parts of Pakistan’s Shia population. The demonstrations of 2026 made that visible in a dramatic way.

But research also tells me where to stop.

Pakistan probably has somewhere around 35 to 46 million Shias, although nobody can provide a verified census number.

We do not have reliable evidence that Shias collectively control Pakistan’s banking system or any fixed share of the national economy.

Nor should sympathy for Iran be confused with willingness to finance Tehran, support its government in every dispute or participate in Iranian strategic networks.

The more useful question is therefore not how many Pakistani Shias support Iran. It is when religious sympathy becomes organised political influence, and when political influence becomes material power.

Those are very different thresholds.

Pakistan has crossed the first one many times. The second is visible in certain religious and political networks. The third is far smaller than the population figures might make us imagine.

And in studying Iran’s influence in Pakistan, that gap may matter more than the headline number of 40 million.