A European civic square at dusk, representing democratic institutions facing political and social pressure.

When “Resistance” Becomes an Excuse to Abandon Liberal Values

I was reading the responses to my recent article on antisemitism and Islamophobia when one sentence stopped me.

“What’s good for the goose is good for the gander.”

The commenter was defending what he called resistance. If a culture seeks dominance and religious law, he argued, resisting that culture is reasonable. He went further. Violence has been justified in the name of such resistance elsewhere, so a Western “culture war” is comparatively gentle.

I understand why this argument attracts people. When someone murders civilians, persecutes women or invokes religion to justify terror, being told to remain liberal and restrained can sound strangely detached from reality.

But the comment contains a problem that reaches well beyond Islam.

What happens when a democracy decides that its principles apply only to people who reciprocate them?

Democracies are allowed to defend themselves

We should clear away one misconception first.

A liberal democracy does not have to tolerate movements seeking to destroy democratic government. Nor must it accept violence, intimidation or the coercive imposition of religious law simply because perpetrators describe these things as religious commitments.

European human-rights law already recognizes this distinction.

In Refah Partisi v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights held that states may oppose political movements seeking changes incompatible with fundamental democratic principles. But the Court also made an important distinction: a political party influenced by religious moral values is not, for that reason alone, inherently hostile to democracy. The proposed political changes and the means used to pursue them matter.

That distinction is easily lost in an angry social-media discussion.

A government can act against a violent Islamist organization without regarding Muslims as a security category. It can prosecute incitement without criminalizing religious identity. Citizens remain free to criticize Islam, Christianity or any other religion, sometimes severely.

These are not contradictions. They are what constitutional government is supposed to manage.

The UN Human Rights Committee makes a similar distinction. Religious practice can face narrowly defined legal restrictions when necessary to protect public safety or other people’s fundamental rights. At the same time, restrictions must not become a pretext for discriminatory treatment.

So the choice is not between surrender and culture war.

There is another option. Law.

The dangerous move from conduct to destiny

The argument becomes different when we stop asking what someone did and start deciding what millions of people intend.

Consider the chain. An Islamist commits an atrocity. The crime is real. The crime is then interpreted as evidence of Islam’s political intention. That supposed intention is transferred to Muslims generally. Ordinary people who have committed no crime can now be treated as participants in a future threat.

I find that final step difficult to accept. It converts evidence about perpetrators into assumptions about populations.

The distinction matters because Muslims contain profound political and theological disagreements. Secular Muslims, conservative believers and Islamists do not constitute a single political actor. Even deeply observant Muslims disagree about the relationship between religious principles and state power.

We can scrutinize doctrines. We can oppose Islamist politics. Neither requires pretending that a Muslim family living quietly in Birmingham has entered into a political contract with an extremist preacher somewhere else.

Hannah Arendt saw the deeper danger

One reader responding to my earlier article brought Hannah Arendt into the discussion. The reference stayed with me.

In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt examined what happens when wrongdoing stops being understood primarily as an individual’s act and becomes an supposedly inherent characteristic imposed upon a category of people. Her warning was that society then enters a “world of fatalities.” People cease to be judged simply for their choices and become suspected of a kind of predestination to wrongdoing.

She was writing in a very different historical context. We should resist lazy comparisons with Nazi Germany. But the mechanism she identified remains worth examining.

Once guilt becomes hereditary, cultural or religious, individual responsibility loses meaning.

The question is no longer, What did this person do?

It becomes, What sort of person is he?

And eventually: What will people like him inevitably do?

I think this is where the “goose and gander” argument goes wrong. It begins with genuine crimes and ends with presumed destiny.

Reciprocity is a poor foundation for rights

“What’s good for the goose is good for the gander” works well enough for everyday favors. It is a dangerous basis for rights.

Suppose an Islamist believes Jews should have fewer rights. Does that allow Britain to give Muslims fewer rights?

Suppose a religious extremist rejects freedom of conscience. Should a democratic state therefore withdraw his freedom of conscience?

The answer cannot simply depend upon reciprocity. Otherwise constitutional rights become rewards for ideological good behaviour.

International human-rights standards take almost the opposite approach. They protect freedom of religion while permitting action against advocacy of religious hatred that amounts to incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. The UN human-rights framework on freedom of religion or belief rests on that distinction.

That doesn’t require anyone to admire a religion. It requires the state to distinguish belief from criminal conduct.

Criticizing Islam is not Islamophobia

This distinction also works in the other direction.

Muslims cannot reasonably demand that criticism of Islam be silenced by labelling every uncomfortable argument “Islamophobia.” Islamic theology can be examined. Hadith can be disputed. Sharia can be criticized. Muslims themselves have been arguing about interpretation, political authority and religious law for centuries.

Antisemitism deserves the same precision. Criticism of the Israeli government is not automatically antisemitic. Treating Jews collectively as responsible for Israel’s actions is something different. I explored the historical danger of collective attribution in Why Antisemitism Keeps Returning to Europe.

The common principle is surprisingly ordinary: judge arguments as arguments, governments by their conduct, and individuals by what they actually do.

It sounds almost boring. Good law often does.

The extremists’ useful mirror

There is also a practical reason to resist collective attribution.

Religious extremists frequently construct politics around an embattled “us” facing a hostile “them.” Anti-Muslim movements can construct the same architecture from the opposite direction.

One points at an extremist attack and says: Look what Muslims really are. The other points at collective hostility toward Muslims and says: Look what the West really thinks of you.

Neither needs the other to be entirely correct. Each needs enough evidence to keep the story alive. Social media supplies plenty.

The discussion that prompted this essay revealed something I had not explored far enough: the feedback loop does not merely increase hostility. It can persuade otherwise democratic people that consistency itself has become a weakness.

That worries me more than an angry slogan.

Liberalism under pressure

Liberal principles are easiest to defend when nothing serious is at stake. Their real test arrives when we encounter people whose beliefs we dislike, perhaps intensely.

There are limits, of course. A person who organizes violence must face the law. Someone who incites attacks cannot hide behind theology. A political organization working through undemocratic means to destroy constitutional government cannot demand that democracy remain passive while it does so.

But none of this requires collective suspicion.

The state already possesses police, prosecutors and courts. It has legislation. Democratic societies can defend themselves through those institutions precisely because they are preferable to communal retaliation.

I keep returning to that sentence: “What’s good for the goose is good for the gander.” It sounds fair. Almost instinctively so.

Yet if an extremist’s contempt for universal rights becomes my justification for abandoning universal rights, he has influenced my politics more profoundly than I may care to admit.

Perhaps that is the harder form of resistance: not refusing to defend ourselves, but refusing to let the people we oppose decide what we become while doing it.

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