Years ago, when I worked at NADRA, I saw identity from the administrative side.
The problem was practical. A state cannot deliver many services reliably if it cannot establish who a person is. Nor can a bank, telecom company or public agency simply accept every claim of identity at face value.
That experience makes me reluctant to join the easy argument that digital identity itself is sinister.
Pakistan needs better identity verification.
But something has changed since those earlier days. Identity is no longer simply a card in someone’s wallet or a record sitting in a government database. Pakistan is building the infrastructure through which identity can increasingly be verified digitally and connected to other services.
That creates enormous possibilities. It also creates a question Pakistan needs to answer before the technology gets too far ahead of the law: When I prove who I am, how much else should the system be allowed to learn about me?
The CNIC is becoming something different
In February 2026, the federal government amended Pakistan’s identity-card rules. Among the changes was formal recognition of QR-based verification. NADRA said the changes created a legal foundation for quicker identity authentication in online and offline environments and would support Pakistan’s wider digital-ID ecosystem.
Then, in August, NADRA began introducing a locally manufactured chipless identity card built around a secure QR code. According to NADRA, the QR code can be verified through its PakID application. Banks, hospitals, telecom operators, Pakistan Railways, police and other authorised institutions are also expected to receive facilities for verification. Existing cards remain valid until they expire.
This may sound like an incremental change to a familiar CNIC. It isn’t.
Pakistan is moving from a system in which the identity card mainly shows identity towards one in which identity can be authenticated digitally across different systems.
NADRA describes its Digital ID project as a way of providing secure, verifiable credentials for access to public and private digital services. Its plans also include a National Data Exchange Layer for controlled information sharing between organisations.
That can solve real problems. Anyone who has dealt with Pakistani bureaucracy knows the absurdity of repeatedly providing photocopies of information that another government department already possesses. Citizens enter the same names and addresses again and again. Officials manually verify documents. Mistakes enter records. Fraud becomes easier when organisations cannot authenticate information efficiently.
A properly designed digital identity system can reduce much of this friction. The mistake would be to stop the discussion there.
Identity verification is not the same as data access
Suppose I need to prove that I am over 18.
One system could tell the organisation requesting verification simply: Yes, this person is over 18.
Another system could disclose my date of birth, CNIC number, address and other information merely because the organisation wanted to check my age.
Both systems have established the same fact. They have not protected my privacy equally.
This distinction is already becoming practical. In my recent article on Pakistan’s debate over keeping under-16s off social media, I examined the awkward question behind age restrictions: who verifies a child’s age, and what information must be surrendered to do it? Digital identity could help answer that problem, but the design of the verification matters as much as the result.
NADRA already presents digital credentials as something citizens can share and organisations can verify with consent. Its description of verifiable credentials says digital documents can be authenticated through QR codes and that organisations can verify them with the citizen’s consent.
The Pakistan Digital Authority is developing another part of this architecture through WASL, the proposed National Data Exchange Layer.
Its technical specification describes a platform through which participating organisations could exchange information using defined APIs and security controls. Importantly, the April 2026 specification is still labelled a working draft at pilot maturity. It should therefore be understood as the direction of the architecture rather than a description of a fully deployed national system.
Some of its privacy principles are encouraging. The PDA’s consent guideline recommends that permission to exchange personal information should be limited to a particular purpose, period and set of data fields. It also says citizens should be able to withdraw consent for future transactions and that information should not subsequently be used for another purpose merely because it has already been obtained.
Those are important ideas. But architecture is only half of the problem. The other half is power.
What happens when today’s verification acquires tomorrow’s purpose?
A database normally begins with a reason for collecting information. Then another institution discovers that the same information could solve a different problem. The second use may sound perfectly reasonable. Then comes another.
This is sometimes called function creep: information collected for one purpose gradually becomes useful for purposes that were not contemplated when it was collected.
Pakistan does not need to imagine this as some futuristic possibility. Its identity system already sits underneath everyday activities.
An expired CNIC, for example, can affect access to bank accounts, mobile services, government welfare programmes and some property or vehicle transactions. NADRA itself highlighted these consequences when urging citizens to renew their cards in 2026.
We can see the same broader administrative logic in Pakistan’s attempt to digitise travel controls. I recently looked at the new e-immigration app and the problem of airport offloading. Better connected records can reduce arbitrary friction, but they also make rules governing access, correction and accountability more consequential.
This is why the safeguards around data exchange matter as much as the technology itself.
Who can request my information?
Which fields can they see?
Can I discover who accessed them?
Can an agency use information obtained for one purpose for something unrelated?
What happens when the database is wrong?
And what remedy does an ordinary citizen have when access to an essential service depends upon that mistake being corrected?
Those questions should not be left to software designers.
Pakistan’s legal framework is still catching up
Here lies the uncomfortable part of Pakistan’s digital transformation.
The technological architecture is moving quickly. The wider privacy framework has moved much more slowly.
Pakistan has discussed comprehensive personal-data legislation for years. Yet the Ministry of Information Technology’s own legislation portal continues to list versions of the Personal Data Protection Bill as drafts, including the May 2023 version.
In 2026, the government also released a draft National Data Governance Policy for public consultation. The proposal talks about interoperability, responsible data sharing, privacy and public trust. Those are welcome objectives, but its status as a consultation draft matters.
This creates an odd sequence. Pakistan is building sophisticated mechanisms for digital verification and inter-agency data exchange while parts of the broader governance framework remain unfinished.
That does not mean the new systems are inherently unsafe. It means Pakistan should resist treating privacy law as paperwork to be completed after the infrastructure has been built.
The order matters.
Consent cannot carry the whole burden
There is another trap.
Governments and technology companies often rely heavily on the word consent. Consent sounds reassuring because it implies choice.
But consider the relationship between a citizen and an institution controlling an essential service.
If I must permit access to information before receiving a service I cannot realistically refuse, how meaningful is my consent?
This is why Pakistan will need more than a button saying “I agree.”
Purpose limitation should be enforceable. Organisations should request only the information genuinely required for the transaction. Access should leave an audit trail. Citizens should have workable mechanisms to challenge misuse and correct inaccurate records.
Some of these principles already appear in the emerging WASL standards. That is a good start. The harder task is turning principles into institutions that work when somebody violates them.
The real choice is not digital identity versus privacy
Pakistan should not abandon digital identity because of these concerns. That would solve the wrong problem.
A country of more than 240 million people cannot realistically build efficient digital public services around handwritten forms, disconnected databases and piles of photocopied CNICs.
Digital verification can reduce fraud. It can make services faster. It can help citizens prove facts about themselves without repeatedly producing documents.
The question is whether Pakistan can design the system so that proving one fact does not automatically surrender ten others.
That is the standard worth pursuing.
I should be able to prove my age without revealing my entire identity record.
I should be able to authenticate myself to a bank without giving every government institution visibility into that transaction.
And when an organisation asks for my data, I should know what it wants and why.
Technology can make those distinctions possible. Whether Pakistan chooses to preserve them is a political and institutional decision.
When I worked at NADRA, identity management was already about something larger than producing a card. It was about establishing trust between a person and an institution.
Digital identity takes that relationship much further.
A CNIC once answered a relatively simple question: Who are you?
Pakistan’s emerging digital infrastructure may eventually be capable of answering many more.
Before we celebrate everything it can know, we should decide what it should be allowed to ask.
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