A fifteen-year-old in Karachi downloads a social-media app. The screen asks for his date of birth. He wants the account, so he changes the year and taps Continue.
Perhaps it takes ten seconds.
That small act sits at the centre of Pakistan’s emerging debate over restricting social-media accounts for children under 16. Setting an age limit sounds straightforward. Making a phone know whether the person holding it is fifteen or nineteen is another matter.
Pakistan has not imposed an Australian-style national ban on social-media accounts for children under 16. Courts are, however, being asked to examine restrictions.
On 6 October, the Lahore High Court considered a petition seeking restrictions on social-media use by children below 16. Chief Justice Aalia Neelum called on the attorney general to assist the court on the legal questions. The petition also seeks amendments to the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act to establish an age-verification mechanism.
A separate case before the Islamabad High Court has already exposed the institutional difficulty. The Pakistan Telecommunication Authority says it lacks statutory authority to impose mandatory age verification or establish a universal minimum age for social-media accounts.
I find that admission more useful than another argument over whether sixteen is the correct number.
Before Pakistan builds an age barrier around social media, Parliament needs to decide what happens at the barrier.
Update: PTA says Parliament must create the age-verification power
Update, 7 October 2026: The legal argument has moved quickly since this article was first prepared. In its report to the Islamabad High Court, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority said it does not possess statutory authority to impose mandatory age verification or create a universal minimum age for social-media accounts. The regulator’s position matters because it shifts the central question from what PTA should do to what Parliament must authorise.
The National Commission on the Rights of Child has taken the argument further. In a 17-page response to the Islamabad High Court, the commission called for age-verification mechanisms and stronger legal protection against online grooming and exploitation. It recommended reviewing PECA from a child-rights perspective and integrating child online safety into Pakistan’s digital-governance framework.
The Lahore High Court is now examining the issue too. Chief Justice Aalia Neelum has sought legal assistance from the attorney general in a petition seeking restrictions on social-media use by children under 16. The petition asks for an age-verification mechanism and amendments to PECA.
There is an important legislative history here. Pakistan’s Social Media (Age-Restricted Users) Bill, 2025 proposed preventing under-16s from creating social-media accounts and requiring platforms to use age verification. The bill was introduced in the Senate on 21 July 2025 and referred to committee, but the Senate’s official record says its movers withdrew it on 18 August 2025. Pakistan therefore does not presently have that proposed age-verification regime in force.
This sequence exposes the institutional gap. Courts can require authorities to explain themselves. PTA can enforce powers Parliament has actually granted it. Child-rights bodies can recommend safeguards. None of them can substitute for a clear statute that defines the duty, limits the collection of identity data and decides who bears responsibility when verification fails.
What Pakistani children are actually facing
There is a reason this debate has reached the courts.
In September 2026, UNICEF, ECPAT International and INTERPOL published a major study of technology-facilitated child sexual exploitation and abuse in Pakistan. Their nationally representative research found that nearly one in sixteen internet-using children aged 12 to 17 had experienced at least one form of such exploitation or abuse during a single year. The researchers estimated that this represented about 1.5 million children.
The experiences included unwanted sexual conversations and requests for intimate images. Researchers also recorded sexual extortion and blackmail. AI-generated abusive material has entered this environment as well.
More than half of affected children told nobody. None of the children surveyed who had experienced this abuse reported it through formal channels such as the police, social workers or helplines.
That detail stopped me.
We can keep debating whether a thirteen-year-old should have an Instagram account. A child who is already being threatened online faces a more immediate problem: whom does she trust enough to tell?
Social-media platforms accounted for 44 percent of the reported instances identified in the research. Forty-four percent is large enough to justify serious attention to those platforms. It also means more than half of the reported instances occurred elsewhere.
An age restriction could close one route of exposure. It cannot become Pakistan’s entire child-online-safety policy.
Age declaration is not age assurance
Most internet users know the old system.
Enter your date of birth.
A teenager who wants access can supply another date. An enforceable restriction therefore requires something stronger than self-declaration.
Regulators use the broader term age assurance for systems intended to establish or estimate whether somebody falls above or below an age threshold.
One method checks age against a trusted source. Another estimates age from a facial image. A platform can also infer an age range from information it already possesses about an account.
None is cost-free.
Government identification may provide a reliable date of birth, but it reveals valuable identity information. Facial estimation avoids handing over a conventional identity document, yet introduces questions about images, accuracy and biometric processing.
Inference creates a different problem. A platform may analyse account activity and other information to decide whether the user behaves like a child.
For Pakistan, the issue quickly becomes familiar.
Do we eventually connect social-media age checks with CNIC records? Would younger users rely on a parent’s credentials? Would adults repeatedly have to prove that they are adults?
You cannot reliably find every under-16 user without examining at least some people who are older.
A child-safety rule can therefore alter the privacy of adults too.
Pakistan has travelled down an identity road before
Pakistanis do not need Australia to teach us what happens when communications become linked with formal identity.
Consider the mobile SIM.
SIM ownership in Pakistan became progressively tied to CNIC records and biometric verification as the state tightened controls over anonymous and improperly registered connections. The system emerged from real security concerns and serious misuse of mobile connections.
Today the procedure feels ordinary. A thumb goes onto a biometric device. NADRA records sit behind the verification system. The phone number has an identifiable owner.
Social media presents a different problem.
A mobile operator has strong reasons to establish who owns a SIM. Facebook, TikTok or another platform trying to establish whether I am older than sixteen does not necessarily need to know that I am Munaeem Jamal.
It needs one fact.
I am above the required age.
That distinction should shape any Pakistani system from the beginning.
If a future age-assurance mechanism can return a simple confirmation that a user meets the age threshold, there is little justification for routinely handing a social-media company a complete identity record.
Pakistan’s experience with SIM verification should make us cautious about something else. Once identity infrastructure becomes embedded in an everyday service, it becomes difficult to imagine the service without it.
We should decide how much identity social media genuinely requires before that architecture exists.
Australia has reached the difficult part already
Australia interests me because it has moved beyond the political slogan and into enforcement.
Since 10 December 2025, designated social-media platforms have been required to take reasonable steps to prevent Australians under 16 from creating or maintaining accounts. Australia’s eSafety Commissioner explains that responsibility falls principally on the platforms. Children and parents are not fined because a teenager manages to circumvent the restriction.
Australia also does not rely on one universal method of proving age.
Platforms can use information they already possess and may apply additional age checks. Depending on the system, that could involve a selfie or another verification service.
Government-issued identification can be offered.
It cannot be the only route.
Australian privacy guidance prevents platforms from forcing people to use government identification when a reasonable alternative can be provided.
I would pay close attention to that provision if Pakistan eventually legislates.
Australia has something else that Pakistan presently lacks: an established national privacy regime governing the handling of personal information. Its regulators have also issued specific guidance on information collected for social-media age assurance.
Pakistan would be building from a different legal foundation.
Our privacy law is still unfinished
Pakistan still lacks a comprehensive personal-data-protection statute in force comparable with established privacy regimes elsewhere.
The Ministry of Information Technology and Telecommunication continues to list the Personal Data Protection Bill as draft legislation.
For years, data protection has sounded like one of those subjects that belongs to lawyers and technology conferences. Age verification makes it rather less abstract.
Suppose a service asks for an identity credential or facial image to establish whether someone is over sixteen.
Someone processes that information.
Someone may store it.
A breach could expose it.
A Pakistani age-verification law therefore cannot concern itself only with keeping children outside an app. It must govern what happens to the information collected at the door.
Pakistan is also expanding its digital public infrastructure. The Digital Nation Pakistan Act 2025 created the Pakistan Digital Authority with responsibilities related to digital identity and data exchange. The authority and NADRA have discussed work involving digital identity, electronic know-your-customer systems and interoperable government services.
I found no evidence that NADRA is being prepared to verify ages for social-media accounts. It would be wrong to imply otherwise.
What the development does show is that Pakistan’s technical capacity to connect identity with digital services is increasing. A similar institutional question appears in my analysis of Pakistan’s new algorithmic bank-data system, where expanding technical capacity also raises questions about safeguards and access.
Law needs to keep pace with that capacity.
The child can disappear from the argument
Something else troubles me about the ban debate.
We can spend so much time deciding whether a child should possess an account that we stop looking at the person exploiting the child.
The UNICEF-led Pakistan research found that in 85 percent of incidents reported by affected children, the perpetrator was someone the child already knew.
That complicates the familiar picture of an unknown predator appearing from nowhere.
Keeping a thirteen-year-old off one social-media platform may prevent a particular contact. It does nothing by itself to the adult blackmailing that child somewhere else.
The disturbing finding that affected children rarely used formal reporting channels points toward the larger institutional weakness.
A child who has sent an intimate image under pressure may fear punishment at home. Another may not know where to report a threat. Police procedures designed for adults can themselves discourage a frightened teenager.
Age assurance addresses access.
Child protection has to continue after access controls fail.
Write the safeguards before building the system
Pakistan does not need to copy Australia’s legislation line by line.
It does need to answer the questions Australia discovered once enforcement became real.
Parliament should first define which services fall within any restriction and make clear who carries the legal duty to enforce it. Platforms also need rules explaining what forms of age assurance they may use.
There must be a way for an adult wrongly classified as a child to correct the decision.
The privacy rule should be simpler: collect as little identifying information as the task requires.
If a service needs to know only whether someone is above sixteen, the system should be designed, as far as technically possible, to answer that question without revealing a full identity.
Government identification should not automatically become the price of opening a social-media account.
PTA’s submission to the Islamabad High Court is useful here. The regulator has acknowledged that its existing statutory authority does not allow it simply to create mandatory age verification on its own.
Parliament should take that boundary seriously.
A system capable of linking online activity with identity deserves legislation, public scrutiny and enforceable limits before it becomes infrastructure.
Back to that phone in Karachi
The teenager still has the phone.
A law can tell him that he must wait until sixteen. If the app merely asks for his birthday, he changes the year.
So Pakistan adds verification.
At that point the problem changes.
The teenager may have to provide something that proves his age. An adult may have to do the same because the platform cannot otherwise know which one is the child.
Now we are no longer discussing only what children should be allowed to see.
We are deciding what Pakistanis must reveal about themselves before entering an online space.
The evidence of online sexual exploitation gives Pakistan good reason to improve protection for children. An age restriction may become part of that response. It should never be mistaken for the whole response.
Nor should child safety become an easy justification for collecting identity information that a platform does not actually need.
The most useful question for Parliament is therefore not simply whether sixteen is the right threshold.
It is harder than that.
How can a platform learn that I am old enough without learning who I am?
By Munaeem Jamal
Research note: This article draws on Pakistani court reporting, official Pakistani digital-policy material, UNICEF/ECPAT/INTERPOL research on online child sexual exploitation, and guidance from Australia’s eSafety and privacy regulators. Legal and policy positions were checked against material available on 6 October 2026.
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