In October 2021, a dispute over the appointment of Pakistan’s intelligence chief exposed tensions between Prime Minister Imran Khan and the army leadership. Six months later, Khan had lost his office through a parliamentary vote. In August 2023, he began a period of imprisonment that continues to shape Pakistan’s politics. The dates are clear. The causes and legal arguments require more care.

Khan’s supporters allege that powerful institutions engineered his removal and later pursued him through criminal cases. Military authorities have denied orchestrating his fall. A credible account must examine each claim alongside the parliamentary record and the rulings of the courts, rather than treating political suspicion as proof.

An alliance that began in cooperation

After the 2018 election, Khan governed with a coalition led by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). His relations with the military leadership initially appeared cooperative. Political analysts often described this arrangement as a ‘hybrid’ system, a label for the continuing influence of unelected institutions alongside an elected cabinet, not a category in Pakistan’s Constitution.

Military influence had shaped Pakistan’s politics long before Khan arrived. What distinguished his administration was the public impression of close civilian-military coordination during its early years. That made the eventual rupture particularly consequential. For a separate assessment of his policies, read Imran Khan’s 44 months in power.

The October 2021 intelligence appointment dispute

The army announced Lieutenant General Nadeem Anjum’s appointment as director-general of the Inter-Services Intelligence, replacing Lieutenant General Faiz Hameed. Khan delayed the formal civilian notification before approving the change. The government stressed the prime minister’s role in the appointment process. Contemporary reports interpreted the delay as a sign that the relationship with Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa had deteriorated.

An appointment disagreement does not prove that the military subsequently directed a parliamentary vote. Khan’s coalition was already under strain, with inflation and disagreements among political partners creating pressure. The dispute nevertheless revealed how a sensitive security appointment could become a public test of civilian authority.

The vote that legally ended his premiership

In early 2022, opposition parties moved a no-confidence motion as coalition partners withdrew their support for Khan. On 3 April, the deputy speaker rejected the motion and President Arif Alvi dissolved the National Assembly on Khan’s advice. On 7 April, the Supreme Court set aside those steps as unconstitutional and restored the Assembly.

In the early hours of 10 April 2022, the Assembly passed the no-confidence motion with 174 votes, two more than the required 172. Khan was removed by a constitutional parliamentary process, not by a formal military coup. The vote establishes how he lost office. It cannot, on its own, establish whether any particular institution pressured individual lawmakers.

Source: Supreme Court’s detailed judgment on the April 2022 constitutional crisis.

What the cipher dispute does, and does not, establish

Khan asserted that the United States objected to his foreign policy and that a diplomatic cable documenting a March 2022 conversation showed foreign involvement in his removal. Washington denied orchestrating the vote, as did Pakistan’s military. A diplomatic message can document displeasure or pressure without proving control over the result of a parliamentary process.

The cable later became the subject of a state-secrets prosecution. A court sentenced Khan to ten years in January 2024, but the Islamabad High Court overturned that conviction in June 2024. It would be inaccurate to describe that sentence as presently operative. The wider political allegations remain contested.

For context, see an earlier examination of the leaked-intercept claims.

May 2023, August 2023: two distinct events

Authorities arrested Khan at the Islamabad High Court in May 2023 in connection with the Al-Qadir Trust investigation. His arrest led to widespread protests, some of which involved attacks on military and state facilities. The Supreme Court later held that the manner of the arrest at the court premises was unlawful. Khan was released, but the legal proceedings continued.

On 5 August 2023, Khan was arrested after a trial court convicted him in the first Toshakhana case, which concerned the declaration and disposal of state gifts. That three-year sentence was subsequently suspended, but he remained detained in other proceedings. These two arrests should not be merged into a single story.

What remains of the criminal cases?

The legal record changed repeatedly. The first Toshakhana prison sentence was suspended. The 2024 cipher conviction was overturned. Khan and Bushra Bibi were acquitted in July 2024 in the case concerning the timing of their marriage. Other proceedings continued.

In January 2025, an accountability court sentenced Khan to 14 years in the Al-Qadir Trust land-corruption case. Prosecutors alleged that land was provided to a trust associated with Khan and Bushra Bibi in exchange for favours concerning funds returned from Britain. Khan denied wrongdoing and contested the conviction.

Reuters reported on 18 August 2026 that all but one of Khan’s convictions had been overturned or suspended, while appeals and other proceedings remained pending. Its review identified the land-corruption conviction as the principal unsuspended sentence at that date. Court outcomes can change: this article does not treat a pending allegation as a conviction or an overturned sentence as still effective.

Source: Reuters review of Khan’s cases, 18 August 2026.

A political movement that survived imprisonment

Khan’s detention did not end PTI’s mobilisation. On 4 October 2026, supporters began a march from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa demanding his release after talks between the party and the federal government failed. Reuters reported on 5 October that authorities tightened security around Islamabad and warned protesters against entering the capital.

The protest reflects continuing political conflict; it does not settle the merits of any criminal case. The government cites public-order concerns, while PTI challenges Khan’s treatment and detention. See also how shipping containers became part of Pakistan’s political protests.

Sources: Reuters, 5 October 2026; Associated Press, October 2026.

Selective accountability is a question of standards

Khan promoted aggressive accountability of political opponents while prime minister. His own cases now raise questions about consistency and due process. Neither his popularity nor the number of prosecutions against him proves guilt or innocence. Those questions belong to courts applying the same evidentiary standards to everyone.

Human rights concerns about political pressure deserve scrutiny. So do allegations involving public funds. Any claim that an identifiable official fabricated a case or ordered Khan’s imprisonment requires evidence beyond inference from the political sequence. Pakistan’s history invites investigation, not a shortcut to certainty.

The institutional question behind his downfall

The immediate explanation for Khan’s removal is constitutional: his coalition lost a confidence vote. The dispute with the military supplies political context, while the later imprisonment arose through separate criminal proceedings. Treating all three as one proven conspiracy would erase important distinctions.

A stronger constitutional order would make it less important whether a prime minister enjoys a personal understanding with army commanders. It would also require cases against powerful politicians to be resolved through independent courts rather than through competing television narratives. Khan’s experience shows why those standards matter both to political leaders in office and to those who have lost power.

Editorial disclosure: This article differentiates documented decisions from allegations and denials. It was reviewed with the 2025 amendments to Pakistan’s Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act in mind. The review is not a guarantee of legal immunity or a substitute for advice from a qualified Pakistani media lawyer.