The battlefield may be the easier part. The harder struggle begins when military power must produce a political result.
A Question That Followed Me Back to Karachi
A few days ago, I was reading a Medium post by AR Mitchell, a regular reader of my work. One passage made me stop. He had brought Vietnam beside Afghanistan in an argument about Ukraine, asking, in effect, why enormous military power so often fails to deliver the political victory its owners expect.
I did not agree with all his conclusions. But sitting in Karachi, I found the question difficult to put aside.
Afghanistan is not distant history from where I live. Pakistan lived beside the Soviet war during my younger years, and we later watched another superpower enter the same country. The Americans possessed capabilities Soviet commanders in the 1980s could hardly have imagined.
In August 2021, the Taliban returned to Kabul. That ending deserves more attention than another comparison of tanks or defence budgets.
America Could Hit Vietnam. It Could Not Decide Vietnam’s Future
We often measure military strength as accountants might examine a balance sheet. One country has more aircraft and better intelligence. Its defence budget dwarfs that of its opponent.
Then war begins, and the arithmetic starts behaving strangely.
Vietnam remains one of the clearest cases. The United States possessed overwhelming conventional capabilities, but Washington’s own records reveal a much harder problem. Could South Vietnam eventually defend itself and sustain the political order the United States wanted to preserve?
By the Nixon years, that question had become central. Washington withdrew American troops while trying to build South Vietnam’s capacity under “Vietnamization.” U.S. State Department historical records show that policymakers remained uncertain whether South Vietnam could develop the strength required to survive without American forces. U.S. Office of the Historian
The uncertainty matters more to me than the familiar argument over who won particular engagements. An army can destroy an enemy position without solving the political problem that produced the fighting. In Vietnam, American firepower could punish North Vietnamese forces severely. It could not guarantee that the political structure Washington supported would survive after American soldiers went home.
Saigon fell in April 1975.
Then Afghanistan Came Back
I remember Afghanistan differently because Pakistan could never treat that country as something happening on television thousands of kilometres away.
The Soviet intervention began in 1979. Moscow eventually withdrew its forces in 1989. Afghanistan contributed to the pressure on the Soviet system, but I would be careful about claiming that the war caused the Soviet Union’s collapse. The USSR carried serious economic weaknesses and political strains of its own.
America’s Afghan experience began under completely different circumstances. After September 11, 2001, American forces and their Afghan partners displaced the Taliban government remarkably quickly. At that moment, U.S. military superiority looked decisive.
But removing a government and constructing one that can survive are different undertakings.
The United States remained for almost twenty years. Brown University’s Costs of War project estimated $2.313 trillion in U.S. spending connected with the Afghanistan war through fiscal year 2022, including operations in Pakistan. The estimate uses a broader accounting than direct battlefield spending alone. Brown University Costs of War
The number is staggering. Yet money is not what interests me most.
I live in a country that absorbed consequences from both Afghan wars. Refugees arrived across our western frontier, while militancy altered Pakistan’s own security environment. Political consequences remained after foreign armies changed their plans.
Geography gave Pakistan no withdrawal date.
The Error Happens Before the War Is Lost
The recurring mistake is not simply that powerful countries underestimate weaker enemies. Something more basic goes wrong.
They confuse the ability to impose military damage with the ability to produce the political condition they want.
Carl von Clausewitz wrote about war as an instrument of political purpose. The important part of that idea is easy to overlook. If military action cannot produce the intended political condition at an acceptable cost, battlefield superiority starts losing some of its meaning.
Afghanistan exposed that problem with unusual clarity. The Taliban never needed to build an air force capable of defeating the United States in the sky. Their survival depended on a different calculation: remaining a viable political and fighting force longer than Washington remained willing to sustain its commitment.
For America, each additional year required money and political consent at home. The Taliban faced another calculation because they were not deciding whether to remain in Afghanistan.
The calendar did not treat the two sides equally. Eventually, Washington negotiated its departure.
Ukraine Is Not Afghanistan
This is where comparisons become dangerous.
Russia’s war against Ukraine is not another Afghanistan. Russia launched a full-scale invasion of a sovereign neighbouring state in February 2022. Ukraine retained a functioning government and receives extensive outside support.
Those differences change the nature of the war. Still, Russia has encountered a version of the old political problem. Its much larger military did not secure the sweeping outcome suggested by the initial drive toward Kyiv. More than four years later, the fighting continues.
The current battlefield also prevents easy claims about who has “won.” Russian forces have continued pressing in eastern Ukraine, while Ukrainian forces have adapted rapidly to a battlefield increasingly shaped by unmanned systems.
Neither a government’s claim nor a week’s movement on a battlefield settles the larger question. Russia can capture territory and still face the problem that began this essay: what political outcome can military force actually secure, at what cost, and for how long?
Ukraine faces hard limits of its own. Its capacity to continue fighting depends heavily on outside financial support. This is why I resist turning Ukraine into another historical slogan. The war remains unfinished.
Better Weapons Keep Tempting Us
Technology makes the old mistake easier to repeat.
Modern weapons can find targets at distances that earlier commanders could barely contemplate. Ukraine has become a laboratory for another shift, particularly the rapid development of unmanned warfare.
The technology is real. So is its military value.
What worries me is the intellectual jump that often follows. The ability to strike with greater precision can encourage governments to believe they have gained equal precision over political consequences.
They have not.
I have watched enough of Afghanistan’s history from this side of the border to distrust that assumption. Foreign armies eventually depart when their governments decide the price has become unacceptable. Countries next door continue living with whatever the war leaves behind.
That difference rarely appears on a weapons specification sheet.
What Does “Winning” Actually Mean?
The word itself may be part of the problem.
If victory means destroying an opposing army, military superiority offers an obvious advantage. If victory means leaving behind a political arrangement that continues after the stronger power reduces its commitment, the calculation changes sharply.
American officials confronted precisely this difficulty during Vietnam. By 1972, State Department records show that Washington’s objectives had narrowed. The administration wanted to extricate American forces without simply abandoning South Vietnam, while giving the government in Saigon a reasonable chance of survival. U.S. Office of the Historian
Afghanistan eventually posed a related problem under very different conditions. Ukraine may end differently again. Its war has not finished, so I see little value in forcing a verdict onto events that are still unfolding.
I began thinking about this because a reader placed several wars beside one another. I would separate them more carefully than he did, but the uncomfortable question survives the comparison.
I have seen two superpowers enter Afghanistan during my lifetime. Both possessed far more military power than the forces they fought.
Both eventually went home.
What remained was Afghanistan and its neighbours, living with a political landscape that military superiority had failed to settle.
Perhaps that is where the word “victory” becomes hardest to define.
Author’s note: An earlier version of this argument appeared on the previous Blogger edition of munaeem.org. I have substantially rewritten and updated it for the current site.
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